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ARBITRATION AND THE CVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
Karen Halverson*
-American workers should not be forced to choose between their
jobs and their civil rights.'
I. INTRODUCTION
David Ewing, former managing editor of the HarvardBusiness Review,
described in 1989 a "significant new trend" among U.S. businesses: the
development of in-house programs to resolve employee disputes fairly,
quickly, and with relatively little expense.2 One company Ewing studied
was Federal Express, which launched its "Guaranteed Fair Treatment
Procedure" ("GFIP") in the early 1980s. The Chief Executive Officer
of Federal Express devotes most of his Tuesdays to sitting on a GFTP
panel to hear employee appeals.' One extraordinary feature of the
GFTP is the complainant's right to nominate a majority of the members
of the employee review panel.4 The GF-P procedure is well-publicized
within the company so that each employee knows her rights: there are
plaques hanging in each company building describing how to use the
procedure. 5
Federal Express's approach to addressing employee grievances is
widely admired6 and is credited for avoiding unionization in a company
* Assistant Professor, The John Marshall Law School. I would like to thank Steven Levine,
Gerald Berendt, Samuel Olken, Michael Heyman,Julie Spanbauer and Donald Beschle for their comments
and support in the preparation of this article. I would also like to thank Amy Walsh for terrific research
assistance.
1. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 104 (1991) (conference report discussing § 118 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991).
2. DAVID W. EWING, JUSTICE ON THE JOB: RESOLVING GRIEVANCES IN THE NONUNION
WORKPLACE 3 (1989).
3. See id at 223-24.
4. Under the Guaranteed Fair Treatment Procedure (GFTP), the complainant may nominate six
employees at or above his or her same job level in selecting the employee review panel. The complainant
then sends these names to the person designated to chair the review panel and that person selects three
names from the list. The chairperson then nominates four persons, from which the complainant selects two
names. The five names selected through this process comprise the voting members of the review panel.
See id. at 229-30.
5. Seeid. at 240.
6. "MotherJones" magazine recently included Federal Express in a list of socially responsible U.S.
companies. The GFTP was described as the "strongest maltreatment process in American business."
Milton Moskowitz, 20 BerPlata to Work- The Woddng ife, MOTHERJONES,July 1997, at 56; see also Seth
Faison,Jr., Rash of Suits Sen Ajr RighsAa, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1991, § 1, at I (describing the reputation
and benefits of Federal Express's employee grievance program).
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that operates in a unionized industry.7 According to management, the
GFTP was set up, among other reasons, to efficiently process employee
complaints and to give employees an effective grievance procedure.8
One Federal Express executive believed the principal benefit of the
program was that it empowered employees by showing them that "there
is a way of dealing with a perceived injustice. ' Thus it appears that the
GFTP not only makes good business sense, but is also good for
employees.
The question that Ewing's book did not address, however, is one on
which the courts, as well as the public, are deeply divided-to what
extent should in-house dispute resolution, particularly binding arbitration, be used as a means of denying victims of employment discrimination access to federal court? This article proposes that, to effectuate the
intent of the civil rights statutes, while also recognizing the federal policy
supporting arbitration, agreements to arbitrate statutory discrimination
claims should be upheld only when truly voluntary.
On November 21, 1991, President Bush signed into law the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 (the "1991 Act").' 0 The express purpose of the 1991
Act is to expand the remedies, such as compensatory and punitive
damages, available to address intentional discrimination in the workplace" and to overrule recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court which narrowed the scope of Title VII.'2 Section 118 of the 1991
Act deals with the use of alternative means of dispute resolution (ADR)
to address discrimination claims. It endorses "where appropriate and
to the extent authorized by law" the use of ADR, including arbitration,
to resolve claims arising under the antidiscrimination statutes-primarily Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities13 Act (ADA)
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).

7. See EWING, supra
note 2, at 228. The company's pilots, however, finally voted to join the Airline
Pilots Association in 1993. See Laurie M. Grossman, FederalFrvpesPilots Vote to Unionize, But Firm Moves to
Contest the Election, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 15, 1993, at A4.
8. See EWING, supra note 2, at 238-39.
9. See id at 239-40.
10. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).

11. See
id § 3(l).

12. See i § 3(4).
13. The full text of § 118 reads as follows: "Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law,
the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation,
facilitation, mediation, factfinding, mini-trials and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising
under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this tide." Id.
§ 118. The "provisions of Federal
law" that were amended by Tide I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 include Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1994), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b
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Just prior to the passage of the 1991 Act, the Supreme Court decided
Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp. ' In Gi/mer, the Court upheld for the
first time an agreement to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims. 5
Since 1991, the circuit courts generally have followed Gilmer, and have
held that statutory employment discrimination claims are arbitrable,
even when the agreement to arbitrate is imposed as a condition to
employment.' 6 In May 1998, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Duffield v. Robertson Stephens &
Company. 7 With Duffield, the Ninth Circuit became the first circuit court
to rule that Congress's enactment of the 1991 Act effectively nullified
the Supreme Court's holding in Gilmer as it applies to mandatory
arbitration. 8 The court in Duffield found unenforceable a standard form
arbitration clause similar to that upheld in Gilmer. One month after

(1994). The text of§ 118 is apparently modeled after identical language contained in the ADA, which was
enacted first, due to President Bush's veto in 1990 of a predecessor bill to the 1991 Act. Se 42 U.S.C. §
12212 (1994) (containing identical language to § 118 of the 1991 Act).
14. 500 U.S. 20 (1990).
15. The statute at issue in Gilmer was the ADEA. Because § 118 of the 1991 Act applies to all of the
statutes amended by Title I of the 1991 Act, see rupra note 13, the arguments made in this article with
respect to arbitrability apply to claims arising under a number of antidiscrimination statutes, including Title
VII, the ADA and the ADEA.
Notwithstanding similarities among the antidiscrimination statutes, however, some have suggested that
the ADEA, which deals with age discrimination, has a different statutory scheme and protects a less
Federal Employment Statutes: When
fundamental interest than Title VII. See G. Richard Shell, ERIMSA and Other
Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 509, 571-72 (1990) (discussing
Is ConvnerzialArbitnaiom an 'Adequate Substitate"forthw
differences in the respective statutory schemes between the ADEA and Tide VII); Martens v. Smith
Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (questioning the applicability of Gilser to Title VII
claims given the "imperfect similarity" between Title VII and the ADEA). This article does not address
these differences, but discusses equally the statutory right against discrimination, whether on the basis of
age, race, gender, or disability.
note 105.
16. Seecasescited infia
17. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998), cerL denid, 119 S. Ct. 465 (1998). Duffidddeparts from a prior
ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on this issue. Cf Mago v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding arbitration, and finding that plaintiff
failed to meet her burden of persuasion that Congress intended to prevent arbitration of Title VII claims).
18. In January 1998, several months prior to the ruling in Dffield, a federal district judge in
Massachusetts ruled that a Form U-4 agreement to arbitrate discrimination claims through the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) was invalid on similar grounds as those reached in Duffield. See Rosenberg v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 204 (D. Mass. 1998). In addition to
interpreting the 1991 Act as precluding mandatory arbitration,Judge Gertner also ruled that the NYSE
arbitral forum was not adequate to vindicate Ms. Rosenberg's discrimination claim, due to the existence
of"an unmistakable pattem of bias within the NYSE system." Id at 207. As this article was going to press,
the First Circuit affirmed Judge Gerner's ruling, but on different grounds. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch,
163 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1998). The court interpreted the 1991 Act to generally permit arbitration, and held
thatJudge Gertner erred in ruling that the NYSE forum was inadequate to protect Ms. Rosenberg's rights.
See id.
at 56. However, the court ultimately agreed that on the facts of the case, arbitration was not
"appropriate" within the meaning of the 1991 Act, as Merrill Lynch did not provide Ms. Rosenberg with
a copy of the NYSE arbitration rules or otherwise specify that employment disputes were subject to
arbitration. See id. at 72.
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Duffield was decided, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Seus v.John Nuveen & Co. 9 upheld mandatory arbitration of
Title VII and ADEA claims, reasoning that the text of section 118
clearly encourages even mandatory arbitration.
The analysis in Seus is flawed. Although the court described the text
of section 118 as evincing a "clear Congressional intent" to encourage
arbitration," the language of section 118 is ambiguous. Section 118
encourages the use of ADR, but it does so only "where appropriate."
In contrast, Congress has indicated in other contexts with detailed, exact
language when a private right of action under a statute may be resolved
by binding arbitration. 2 Moreover, to interpret section 118 as
endorsing mandatory arbitration flatly contradicts the history of the
1991 Act.22 A more appropriate reading of section 118 would balance
these concerns against the federal policy favoring arbitration. The
language "where appropriate" in section 118 should be interpreted to
encourage arbitration only when the agreement to arbitrate meets a
heightened voluntariness test, similar to the requirement for a "knowing
and voluntary" waiver specified in the Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act.2"
Part I of this article discusses the arbitrability of public law rights and
analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer in the context of the
Court's prior decisions on arbitrability. Part II evaluates the Duffield and
Seus courts' differing interpretations of section 118. Part III proposes
that section 118 be interpreted to encourage arbitration only where the
agreement to arbitrate meets a heightened voluntariness test. Part IV
concludes that when arbitration of statutory discrimination claims is
imposed as a condition to employment, it is not voluntary and should
not be enforced.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. LAW ON ARBITRABILITY
The Supreme Court's recent decisions on arbitrability of statutory
claims have proceeded from the Court's interpretation of the strong
Congressional policy favoring arbitration expressed in the United States
Arbitration Act of 1925 (Federal Arbitration Act or FAA).24 Thus,

19. 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998).
20. Id at 182.
21. See infta
notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
22. See infia notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
23. Se ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1988), amendd by Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, (OWBPA)
Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 201, 104 Stat. 978, 983 (1990).
24. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925).
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arbitrability of statutory claims is presumed unless Congress expresses
a contrary intention "discernible from the text, history, or purposes of
the statute."25 However, the Court has not always adopted such a broad
view of the FAA's purpose. The Supreme Court's strong policy favoring
arbitration, grounded in its expansive interpretation of the FAA, evolved
during the 1980s. 6 Indeed, the notion that statutory rights are
presumptively arbitrable unless Congress expresses a contrary intention
was articulated by the Court only in 1985, more than half a century
after the FAA was enacted.
A. Policy Concerns
Traditional judicial hostility to arbitration dates back to the practice
of English courts in the 1700s, pursuant to which arbitration agreements
as a general matter were not enforced.28 The unconvincing rationale
often cited for this hostility was that arbitration "oust[ed] the jurisdiction
of the courts., 29 Judicial suspicion of arbitration more significantly was
grounded in policy concerns that Ian Macneil described as "countercurrents" to the arbitration movement.3 0 One countercurrent is a policy
concern that arbitration enables business to evade public regulation."'
Because arbitrators, for example, may decide disputes pursuant to
commercial or equitable principles instead of legal rules, early commentators of arbitration criticized its use by business to avoid the law. 2 The
other countercurrent against arbitration is a concern about onesidedness; 3 that is, that arbitration agreements entered into unfairly
should not be enforceable.
For a long time, critics of arbitration have contended that it tends to
be utilized by dominant groups in order to avoid liability while
maintaining a semblance of harmonious relations with disadvantaged

25. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987). For a discussion of
McMahon, see infta notes 64-74 and accompanying text.

26. See, eg., G. Richard Shell, The Role of Publi Law in PfivateDispute Resolution. Reflections on Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. BUS. LJ. 397, 401-02 (1988) (discussing the Supreme
Court's "reshaping" of the FAA during the early 1980s into a "national arbitration law").
27. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
28. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982 (2d Cir. 1942).
29. Id. at 983. Critical of the "hypnotic" power of this phrase, Judge Jerome Frank made the
following pun: "Give a bad dogma a good name and its bite may become as bad as its bark." Id at 984.
30. Se IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,

INTERNATIONAUZATION 61-66 (1992).
31. Seeid
32. S&e
Heinrich Kronstein, BusineuArbivtion-InsrnentofPfioate Govrnment, 54 YALE LJ. 36, 66-67
(1944).
33. See MACNEIL, supra note 30, at 59-60.
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groups. There is a difference, for example, between the use of arbitration to resolve disputes among individuals,3 4 and arbitration between an
individual and a business. The latter situation creates "opportunities for
dominant interests to weigh down the balance in their favor. 3' 5 In a
famous study of the development of alternative dispute resolution in the
United States,Jerold Auerbach documented the use of arbitration over
one hundred years ago to perpetuate disparities of class and race.
Arbitration panels were established in the Reconstruction South to
resolve disputes between white planters and freed slaves.3" As the white
planters only accepted the tribunals to the extent that they could control
them, Auerbach observed that arbitration "inevitably served the
interests of the dominant group."3 7 He made a similar observation with
respect to the history of labor arbitration. Notwithstanding the
"alluring" example of labor arbitration promoting peaceful relations
between labor and management, Auerbach pointed out that this
characterization is inaccurate.3 8 It was labor law reform during the New
Deal, not the prior development of labor arbitration, which gave
employees legal rights backed by government sanctions, required
employers to enter into collective bargaining, and finally effected
significant change in labor-management relations.3 9 Until that time,
Auerbach wrote, "the vast disparity of power between labor and
management, and the open warfare that punctuated American
industrial relations, stifled the labor movement, which remained an
unwilling and dependent participant in the arbitration process."' The
fundamental problem in both instances was that arbitration, a creature
of private agreement, "imposed harmony" between the parties while
preserving the status quo to the benefit of the white planters and

34. Heinrich Kronstein gives, as an example of unobjectionable arbitration, an arbitration clause
from George Washington's will, providing that "all disputes (if
unhappily any should arise) shall be decided
by three impartial and intelligent men, known for their probity and good understanding." Kronstein, supra
note 32, at 39 n.I1 (quoting Fred I. Kent, Pioneers inAmeican Arbitration, 17 N.Y.U. LQ. REV. 501, 502-03
(1940)).
35. Id at 39. German law recognized the danger of such domination in a 1933 amendment to its
code ofcivil procedure. The amendment declared arbitration agreements "without effect ifany party to
the agreement exploits its economic and social superiority for the purpose of compelling the other party
to enter into an arbitration agreement by virtue of which the compelling party would obtain a stronger
position." Id. at 52 n.84 (quoting CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 1025 II, amndedby Reichzgestzblatt, 1787
(1933)) The Nazi government subsequently nullified this amendment when it came to power. See id.
at 52
n.84.
36. SeeJEROLD S.AUERBACH,JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 58-60(1983).
37. Id. at 59.
38. See id at 118.
39. See
id
40. Id. at 65.
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industry owners.4 ' As arbitration benefits dominant interests in this
manner, its use to resolve public law claims may not be effective,
especially where the parties are unequally situated.
These concerns are augmented when one considers the adhesive
nature of a typical arbitration clause. Even when not imposed as a
condition of employment, arbitration clauses are classic "contracts of
adhesion." One commentator observed that courts pay "lip service" to
the idea that pre-dispute arbitration is a creature of free bargaining.
Arbitration cannot be consensual when presented as a "take-it-or-leaveit proposition."'42 Employees, like adherents in other contexts, typically
do not pay attention to arbitration clauses, but usually focus on the wage
provision of an employment contract.4 Even when adherents read the
actual arbitration clause, they, unlike the employer who drafted the
clause, are unlikely to have sufficient experience to comprehend its
significance, and therefore, are likely to undervalue the right they are
giving up by agreeing to arbitration.' The "voluntariness" of the

41. Id at 66. In fact, Auerbach's book concludes that only in the case of communitarian forms of
alternative dispute resolution, where the parties share a "commitment to common values," is it possible to
achieve "justice without law." Id. at 16.
In his own study tracing the historical development of American arbitration law, Ian Macneil's
assessment of arbitration was similarly equivocal: "In sum, I believe that the work of the arbitration reform
movement ... has been something of a Good Thing, but like all Good Things, hardly the Summum
Bonum Free of Flaws suggested by its past and present partisans." MACNEIL, supra note 30, at ix.
42. See David S.Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print
to PRvect Big Business: Employee and Conewner Rights
Claims in an Age of Compeled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L REV. 33, 58. Schwartz's analysis draws on Todd
Rakoff's renowned analysis of adhesion contracts. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion." An Essay in
Reconstnction, 96 HARV. L REV. 1173, 1225 (1983).
43. See Schwartz, supra note 42, at 57.
44. See id To illustrate the difficulties ofcomprehending arbitration clauses, consider the arbitration
clause set forth below:
IN CONSIDERATION AND AS A MATERIAL CONDITION OF THE
EMPLOYMENT AND CONTINUATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE EMPLOYEE
AS OF THE DATE OF THIS EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE ARBITRATION
PROCEDURE ("EOnent Dispute Arbitration PAocehos) BECOMES EFFECTIVE, THE
EMPLOYEE AND THE EMPLOYER (as this term is defined below) (collectively, the
"Parties") AGREE TO SUBMIT FOR RESOLUTION PURSUANT TO THIS
Employment Dispute Arbitration ProcedureANY EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE (as this term is
defined below), AND FURTHER AGREE THAT ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO
THIS Empoyment Dispue Arbitration Prcedure IS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS FOR
RESOLUTION OF SUCH DISPUTE AND THAT BOTH THE EMPLOYER AND
EMPLOYEE HEREBY WAIVE THEIR RESPECTIVE RIGHTS, IF ANY, TO
RESOLVE ANY DISPUTE THROUGH ANY OTHER MEANS, INCLUDING A
JURY TRIAL OR A COURT TRIAL IN A LAWSUIT, EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY
PROVIDED IN THIS Empoyment DisputeArbitration rocedure.
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatsy Arbitration of IndidualEmployment Rikghts: The Yellow Dog Contractof
the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L REv. 1017, 1038-39 (1996) (citingJay W. Waks &John Roberti, Chaenge to
Employment ADR Processes, Rather than Pncpl, Are at Issue, N.Y. ST. Bj. (June 1996)). This clause, not
exactly a paradigm of plain English, was proposed by the Center for Public Resources as a model to use
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agreement is further compromised when it is imposed as a condition to
employment or as a condition to future promotions or benefits within a
company. 5
To summarize, some argue that arbitration enables businesses to
evade legal rules and is one-sided. To the extent that arbitration is onesided, both concerns may come into play. An employer who is able to
control the arbitration process (for example, by setting the terms in the
agreement for the selection of arbitrators, the arbitrators' authority to
award damages, and applicable procedural rules) can somewhat evade
enforcement under the statute by limiting its own liability.
B. Supreme CourtDevelopment of Public Policy Exception
Prior to the 1980s, the Supreme Court acknowledged the sorts of
concerns raised in the previous section by carving out an exception to
arbitrability under the FAA for disputes that implicated certain
statutory, public law rights.' Characteristic of the Supreme Court's
early approach towards arbitration of statutory, public law rights is its
1953 holding in Wilko v Swan,47 in which the Court refused to enforce an
arbitration agreement to resolve a claim arising under the Securities Act
of 1933 (the "1933 Act"). 8 The Court, while recognizing the pro-

to ensure that employees receive adequate notice that they are waiving the right to ajudicial forum. See
id at 1039.
45. Katherine Van Wezel Stone refers to pre-dispute arbitration clauses as "the yellow dog contract
of the 1990s." Id. at 1037. Yellow dog contracts, which have now been outlawed by federal legislation,
condition employment on a promise by the prospective employee not to join a union. See idat 1037.
Stone argues that, like the 19th century yellow dog contracts, pre-dispute arbitration agreements are
imposed on workers "without even the illusion of bargaining." Id.
46. This exception to arbitrability is analogous to the idea of mandatory rules of law whose
application, for reasons of public policy, cannot be avoided through the use of a choice of law clause.
Mandatory rules of law concern public policy (ordrepubic)and "reflect a public policy so commanding that
they must be applied even if the general body of law to which they belong is not competent by application
of the relevant rule of conflict of laws." Pierre Mayer, Mandatoiy Rules of Law in InternationalArbitration,2
ARB. INT'L 274, 275 (1986). For a theoretical framework for analyzing the arbitrability issue grounded in
a conception of Kantian rights, see Edward Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to
the Arbitrabiliy Question, 60 S.CAL L. REV. 1059, 1070-75 (1987) (suggesting that arbitrability should be
determined in reference to whether the claim embodies society-wide distributive or regulatory functions).
Finding that certain public law matters cannot be resolved by arbitration is not inconsistent with
international practice. The international convention on mutual recognition and enforcement ofarbitral
awards recognizes an exception to arbitrability for public law issues. See Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, art. V(2)(a), 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 40 (1959)
(allowing a court to refuse to enforce award if subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under local law).
47. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), ovemded by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989).
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1933) (hereinafter "1933 Act").
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arbitration policy reflected in the FAA, found that the pro-investor
policy behind the 1933 Act would be better served by prohibiting the
arbitration of 1933 Act claims.
More than twenty years after Wilko, the Supreme Court ruled in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 49 that the right to a judicial forum to
resolve Title VII discrimination claims could not be waived through an
arbitration agreement. The agreement to arbitrate at issue in GardnerDenver was contained in a collective bargaining agreement.5" Harrell
Alexander, a drill operator, brought a Tide VII suit against his
employer, Gardner-Denver Co., alleging that he was fired on account
of his race. Although Mr. Alexander had previously submitted his
discrimination claim to arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining
agreement entered into by his union, the Supreme Court held that Mr.
Alexander had not waived his right to take his Title VII claim to court.
The Court interpreted Title VII as providing overlapping, rather than
mutually exclusive, remedies against discrimination.5' In support of its
holding, the Court emphasized the role that private claimants play in
enforcing the statute: "although the 1972 amendment to Tide VII
empowers the [EEOC] to bring its own actions, the private right of
action remains an essential means of obtaining judicial enforcement of
Title VII."52 The Supreme Court later extended the rule in GardnerDenver to other statutes protecting employee rights.53
To summarize, with Wilko and Gardner-Denverand its progeny, the
Supreme Court made an exception to the federal policy favoring
arbitration, whether grounded in the FAA or the Labor Management
Relations Act, when the agreement to arbitrate implicated public law
statutory rights. This circumscribed approach to the arbitrability
question continued for thirty-two years, beginning with the Court's 1953

49. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
50. Labor arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement raises different issues than
arbitration pursuant to an individual employment agreement. First, the fact that the agreement to arbitrate
in the labor context is entered into between the employer and the union (not the plaintiff employee) creates
a conflict of interest. See Shell, supra note 15, at 519. Second, the overall purpose of labor arbitration is
geared towards keeping industrial peace. See it at 522. Finally, the agreement to arbitrate is not governed
by the FAA, but by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. See idat 518. S also Pryner v. Tractor
Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 362-64 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing the problem of consent in the collective
bargaining context and noting that labor arbitration is governed by § 301).
51. See Gardner-De , 415 U.S. at 47.
52. Id. at 45.
53. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (applying Gardner-Demerto a
case involving overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466
U.S. 284 (1984) (applying Gardner-Dnvrto a § 1983 claim).
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decision in Wilko and lasting until the Court decided MitsubishiMotors v.
Soler Chrysler-Plmouth54 in 1985.
C. Supreme Court Reversal on Arbitrabili!y
The first cases in which the Supreme Court upheld the arbitrability
of statutory rights involved international commercial arbitration, in
which arbitration has long been accepted 55 and concerns about onesidedness are mitigated. The Supreme Court first upheld an international agreement to arbitrate securities law disputes in 1974 in Scherk v.
Alberto Culver,56 two years after the Supreme Court approved the use of
forum selection clauses in international commercial transactions.57 In
Scherk, in which the arbitration clause at issue was contained in an
international commercial contract, the Court made an exception to its
previous policy expressed in Wiko.58
The Court's decision in Mitsubishi59 also involved international
arbitration, but was more significant than Scherk in terms of the proarbitration rationale the Court adopted. Mitsubishi involved the
arbitrability of Sherman Act claims arising out of a distribution and sales
agreement between ajapanese company and a Puerto Rican dealership.
The Court began by citing the strong policy favoring arbitration in the
FAA and set forth a presumption in favor of arbitrability of public law
rights: "[H]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be
held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies of the statutory rights at issue." 6 As the

54. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). Although the Court upheld the arbitration ofsecurities law claims in &herk
v. Alberto Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974), the Court carefully limited the holding in that case to international
commercial arbitration. See infta note 58 (discussing &d.7k).
55. For example, investment disputes between a state and a national of another state have been
resolved by arbitration since the 1800s. See Gerhard Wegen, Dispute Settlement and Arbitration in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: AvoIDANCE AND SETTLEMENT 59,65 (SeymourJ. Rubin &

Richard W. Nelson eds., 1985) (describing a history of "rich practice" in international investment dispute
arbitration).
56. 417 U.S. at 506.
57. In Brenen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), the Court upheld the use of a clause
designating the.London Court ofjustice to hear disputes arising under a towage contract entered into
between a U.S. and a German company. The Court emphasized the fact that the agreement was entered

into in an "arms-length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen" in the context of an
international commercial transaction. Id. at 12.

58. The Court distinguished Wo on the grounds that the agreement at issue in Scherk involved an
international transaction. The Court reasoned that an arbitration clause contained in an international
commercial agreement raises issues that are "significantly different" from those in a domestic transaction,
in which the laws of the United States unquestionably would govern disputes. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-16.
59. 473 U.S. at 614.
60. It at 628.
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Court did not find such an intention in the text of the Sherman Act,6'
the Court also attacked the idea that arbitration was an inappropriate
vehicle for resolving Sherman Act disputes.62 Although ruling that
international arbitration was not per se inadequate, the Court did suggest
a limitation: "[In the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law
clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to
pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little
hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy."63
Thus the Court suggested that an arbitration clause that prevented the
arbitrators from applying the Sherman Act in resolving antitrust claims
would be unenforceable.
Two years after Mitsubishi the Court decided ShearsonlAmencan Express
Inc. v. McMahon.64 McMahon was particularly significant because it
involved a customer contract instead of an international commercial
agreement. The customers in this case were Eugene and Julia
McMahon, who opened brokerage accounts with Shearson/American
Express on behalf of themselves and as trustees for a number of pension
and profit-sharing plans. When the McMahons brought a lawsuit
against Shearson, alleging that the broker who handled their accounts
engaged in fraudulent, excessive trading, Shearson sought to compel
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause. As the relationship
between the contracting parties was customer-broker and, because the
contract itself was apparently a non-negotiated standard form agreement prepared by Shearson,65 compelling arbitration of the McMahons'
claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)66 raised

61. S&e
i at 628-29. After articulating a test of arbitrability based on congressional intentJustice
Blackmun's opinion noted the "absence of any explicit support" in the Sherman Act for precluding the
arbitration of antitrust claims. Id at 628. The Court also refused to read into the private right of action
and treble damages provisions of the Sherman Act an intent to preclude arbitration. See id at 635-37.
62. See MACNEIL, supra note 30, at 74-76 (noting that in Mitsubishi, the Court rejected much of its
earlier reasoning against arbitrability).
63. SeeMitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19.
64. 482 U.S. 220 (1986).
65. According to the district court opinion, the arbitration clause thatJulia McMahon signed was
contained in paragraph 13 of a "Customer's Agreement" prepared by Shearson which provided:
[A]ny controversy arising out of or relating to my accounts, to transactions with you for me
or to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with
the rules, then in effect, of the [NASD or NYSE] and/or the American Stock Exchange,
Inc., as I may elect.
McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994).

456

UNIVERSITY OF CICLVCIA TI LA WREVIEW

[Vol.67

questions of fairness. 6 However, a majority of the Court upheld the
arbitration agreement.
As in Mitsubishi, the McMahon Court proceeded from the proposition
that the FAA's pro-arbitration policy should be followed wherever
possible. The Court held that the McMahons bore the burden of
demonstrating, through the 1934 Act's text, legislative history, or
underlying purposes, that Congress intended to "limit or prohibit"
arbitration of 1934 Act claims.68 The Court found, contrary to Wilko,
that the protections of the 1934 Act could be waived through an

arbitration clause.69 Although the Act contained an antiwaiver
provision, the Court interpreted it to apply only to the waiver of
substantive obligations imposed by the Act and not to the waiver of a
judicial forum.70 The Court also refused to find that amendments to the
1934 Act ratified the doctrine in Wko, notwithstanding the fact that the
legislative history to the amendments cited Wilko with approval.7
not inconsistent with
Ultimately the Court found that arbitration was
72
investors.
protecting
of
purpose
the 1934 Act's
In McMahon the Court effectively, although not expressly, overruled
Wilko." However, in doing so, the Court emphasized the role of the

67. AsJustice Blackmun argued in his dissent, "[C]ompelling an investor to arbitrate securities
[T]he investor has the impression,
claims puts him in a forum controlled by the securities industry....
frequentlyjustified, that his claims are beingjudged by a forum composed of individuals sympathetic to the
securities industry and not drawn from the public." McMahon, 482 U.S. at 260-61. Although Justices
Blackrnun, Marshall, and Stevens were of the view that a customer's fraud claim against a broker under the
Exchange Act was not arbitrable-that Wdko was controlling-the Court unanimously found that the
McMahons' RICO claim was arbitrable. See id.at 241-42. Thus the controversy centered on the Exchange
Act claim.
68. Id at 227.
69. See i Without explicitly overruling Widko, the Court read W'dko narrowly as barring waiver of
ajudicial forum only when arbitration is "inadequate to protect the substantive rights at issue." Id. at 229.
70. See id at 228. Note that, although W'dko isa 1933 Act case, the 1933 and 1934 Acts contain
identical anti-waiver clauses. See Shell, rupranote 26, at 408 n.81 (citing the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78cc, 78n (1994), which prohibits waiver of "compliance with any provision" of the
Act).
71. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 236. The legislative history referred to is a sentence from a
Conference Report which read as follows: "It was the clear understanding of the conferees that this
amendment did not change existing law, as articulated in Wdko v. Swm, concerning the effect of arbitration
proceedings provisions in agreements entered into by persons dealing with members and participants of selfregulatory organizations." Id at 236-37 (cirng H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-229, at 111 (1975), reprintedin 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 289) (citation omitted). The Court responded by noting that (i) Congress never expressly
extended the doctrine in W'dko (a 1933 Act case) to 1934 Act claims; (ii) the exact reason for which the
committee cited Wtd/kis unclear, and (iii) the excerpt quoted above fails to reveal the Committee members'
understanding of "existing law." Id at 237-38.
72. See id. at 238.
73. See Shell, supra note 26, at 414. The cases are distinguishable as Wdks involves a claim under
the 1933 Act and McMahon involves a 1934 Act claim. The Court expressly overruled Wko in 1989. See
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
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*Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in overseeing the securities
arbitration system. Specifically, the Court reasoned that Wil/o's
assumptions regarding the adequacy of securities arbitration were no
longer true, given amendments to the 1934 Act which expanded the
SEC's power to "ensure the adequacy" of arbitration organized by self
regulatory organizations within the securities industry.74 Thus, the
SEC's authority to regulate the arbitration process was found to be
sufficient to assure that arbitration of statutory claims was consistent
with the regulatory and remedial purposes of the 1934 Act.
D. UpholdingArbitrabiliyof DiscriminationClaims in Gilmer
Throughout the 1980s, as the Supreme Court established that public
law claims under the antitrust and securities statutes could be submitted
to binding arbitration, Gardner-Denver, which held that employment
discrimination claims could not be precluded through arbitration, still
prevailed. Gardner-Denveris still generally considered to be controlling
law with respect to labor arbitration."h Although not directly addressing
the effect of Gilmer on Gardner-Denver,the Supreme Court unanimously
held this term that a general arbitration clause in a collective bargaining
agreement cannot waive an employee's right to litigate a discrimination
claim under the ADA. 76
In 1991, the Supreme Court decided Gilmer, and, for the first time,
recognized that a discrimination claim under the ADEA could be
subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an individual employment

74. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233-34. The 1934 Act requires approval from the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) for any rule change adopted by a "self-regulatory organization" (SRO) in the
securities industry, including any national securities exchange such as the NYSE or registered securities
association such as the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). Se 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1994).
In fact, as the Court pointed out, the SEC exercised this regulatory authority when it approved the
securities industry arbitration procedures at issue in McMahon. See id at 234. For the text of these
procedures, see UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION, reprintd in Fifth Report of the Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration, Exhibit C (Apr. 1986), cited in G. Richard Shell, The Role of PublicLaw in Private
Dispute Resolution Reflections on Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 397, 410
n.92 (1988).
75. See eg., Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that Gardnr-Dnver
still controls an arbitration clause contained in a collective bargaining agreement). But cf Austin v. OwensBrockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that an arbitration clause contained
in a collective bargaining agreement could preclude judicial resolution of Tide VII and ADA claims).
76. SeWright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 . Ct. 391 (1998). Justice Scalia's opinion
in Wright deliberately left open the question of whether a predispute agreement to arbitrate is enforceable
in light of the ADA provision, identical to § 118 of the 1991 Act, that only encourages arbitration where
"appropriate." Without elaboration on the effect of this language on Gimer,Justice Scalia simply stated that
"a union waiver of employee rights to a federal judicial forum for employment discrimination claims"
would not be "appropriate" when the waiver was not "clear and unmistakable." Id at 397 n.2.
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agreement. The plaintiff in the case, Robert Gilmer, was employed by
Interstate as a financial manager. The agreement that contained Mr.
Gilmer's arbitration clause was not the employment agreement itself,
but was rather a "Form U-4," the standard application for registration
in the securities industry." As the U-4 was required as a condition to
Mr. Gilmer's registration with the New York Stock Exchange as well as
with other exchanges, signing the U-4 was in essence a prerequisite to
.obtaining employment in the securities industry.78 After being fired at
age sixty-two, Mr. Gilmer brought a suit against Interstate alleging age
discrimination in violation of the ADEA, and Interstate in turn sought
to compel arbitration under the FAA, citing the U-4 that Mr. Gilmer
signed.
Citing its previous holding in McMahon, the Supreme Court first
looked to whether the ADEA's text, history, or purpose evinced an
intent to preclude arbitration.79 Finding no such evidence in the text or
legislative history of the ADEA, the Court's decision ultimately turned
on a conclusion that arbitration was adequate to promote the purposes
underlying the ADEA;8 ° in other words, the Court found no inherent
conflict between arbitration and the purpose of the ADEA in eliminating age discrimination.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Gilmer has had an enormous impact
on employment law. Understandably, the decision has also generated
a considerable amount of controversy.8 ' On the one hand, it was to be

77. Interstate's terms ofemployment required that Mr. Gilmer register as a securities representative
with the NYSE, which in turn required completion of the Form U.-4. See Gilmer v. Intlrstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1990).
The Form U-4, the "Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer," must be
completed by any person associated with a registered broker or dealer. In 1993, the SEC enacted a rule
requiring that any person associated with a registered broker or dealer who is involved in buying or selling
securities must be registered in accordance with standards adopted by the self-regulatory organization of
which such broker or dealer is a member. Self-Regulatory Commission Organizations, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-39,421, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,164, 66,164 n.3 (Dec. 10, 1997) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.1567-1
(1993)). In accordance with this rule, self-regulatory organizations within the securities industry, including
the NYSE and the NASD, require any person associated with a registered broker or dealer to complete the
Form U-4. Id. at 66,165. The arbitration clause contained in the Form U-4 is quoted at infra note 112.
78. The NASD recently eliminated the arbitration requirement for statutory employment claims,
effective January I, 1999, and the NYSE has proposed a similar rule change pending SEC approval. See
infta notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
79. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
80. For example, the Court rejected Mr. Gilmer's arguments challenging the adequacy of
arbitration procedures as "far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes
favoring this method of resolving disputes." ld at 30 (ctirtg Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)).
81. Many articles have been published on Giber since the Supreme Court handed down the decision
in May 1991. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, PredisputeAgreements to Arbitrate Statutoy Employment Claims, 72
N.Y.U. L REV. 1344 (1997); Stone, supra note 44; Robert A. Gorman, 77Te
Gilmer Decisionand the Private

1999]

ARBITRA TIONAND CIVIL RIGHTS

459

expected, and is consistent with cases such as McMahon and Mitsubishi,
that the Court refused to challenge the adequacy of arbitration per se. 82
However, there are a number of questionable assumptions on which the
Gilmer Court relied in concluding that arbitration in Mr. Gilmer's case
was consistent with the purposes of the statute.83
First, the Court rejected Mr. Gilmer's argument that arbitration
would undermine enforcement of the ADEA.84 The Court reasoned
that, because a claimant under the ADEA who has signed an arbitration
agreement is still free to file a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the EEOC will still receive
information of violations of the Act.85 Thus the Gilmer Court implicitly
rejected the reasoning in Gardner-Denver that emphasized Congress's
intent of utilizing private enforcement to eliminate discrimination under
Title VII.
The Gilmer Court cited McMahon in support of this proposition, noting
that securities law claims were held to be arbitrable notwithstanding
SEC involvement in enforcement.86 However in McMahon, arbitration
was upheld because of the SEC's broad authority to enforce the statute.
When the Supreme Court upheld securities arbitration in McMahon, it
noted that the SEC has "expansive" power to oversee securities
arbitration conducted by self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") in the
industry.87 In this sense, the facts in Gilmer are rather different. The
Arbitration of Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL L. REv. 635 (1995); ewis Maltby, ParadiseLost-How the
Gilmer Cowl Lost the O
vyforAimatizv Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L SCH.J. HUM.
RTS. 1(1994); Douglas E. Abrams, Arbifrabity in Rawt Fedff CivilRightsLegislation: The teedforAmendment,
26 CONN. L REV. 521 (1994); Miriam A. Cherry, Not-So-ArbitraryArbitration: Using Ttle VII DisparateImpact
Anaysis to InvahateEnployment Contractsthat Discriminate, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 267 (1998); Pierre Levy,
Gilmer Rvisite" The JudicialErosion ofEmployee Statutoy Rghts, 26 N.M. L REV. 455.(1996).
82. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 ("We decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral
body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious and impartial
arbitrators" (quoting Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1974))).
83. This article does not address the primary argument on which Justice Stevens based his dissent
and which has been discussed at length elsewhere--that § I of the FAA expressly exempts from its coverage
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class ofworkers engaged in interstate
commerce." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 36 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)). For further analysis
on determining the scope of FAA § 1, see Estrcicher, supranote 81, at 1363-72; Wendy S. Tien, Compulsory
Arbitration ofADA Claims: Disablingthe Disabled, 77 MINN. L REV. 1443, 1448-53 (1993); Developments in the
Lawo-EmploytentDiscrnmination, 109 HARV. L REv. 1568, 1675-76 (1996).
84. See Gi/ner, 500 U.S. at 28.
85. Seeid
86. See id. at 28-29.
87. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233 (1986). Included in such
powers isthe power to 'abrogate, add to, and delete from' any SRO rule if it finds such changes necessary
or appropriate to further the objectives of the Act." Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1994)); see also supra notes
64-74 and accompanying text.
Indeed, in McMahon, the SEC itself submitted an anicus curiae brief urging that arbitration be upheld.
See id at 250 (Blackmun,J., dissenting in part) (citing Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as
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EEOC does not enjoy comparable authority under the ADEA to
regulate arbitration of age discrimination suits.88 Indeed, the EEOC
spent the first years of its existence without any power to bring enforcement actions, 9 and even today its powers are somewhat limited in
practice. For example, although the ADEA authorizes the EEOC to
bring enforcement actions,9" a federal judge recently held that the
EEOC could not seek monetary damages in an enforcement action that
it brought under the ADEA when the employees had signed a mandatory, standard form arbitration agreement." In addition, the EEOC has
long been forced to operate under severe budget constraints. Although
the EEOC has been charged with the enforcement of three new statutes
since 1990,92 its budget, when adjusted for inflation and existing
employee salary increases, has actually decreased." The holding in
Gilmer, combined with a lack of resources to support the EEOC's
activities, effectively dilutes the impact of the 1991 Act-by enforcing
mandatory arbitration clauses to remove discrimination claims from
federal courts while limiting financial support for EEOC enforcement
efforts.
In finding that arbitration is consistent with the purpose of the ADEA,
the Gilmer Court also emphasized the flexibility of ADR methods that
the EEOC utilizes in resolving discrimination claims under the statute.

Aminis Curie at 10, McMahon (No. 86-44)) (noting the SEC's argument that the pr6blems with arbitration
referred to in W4dko no longer exist because of the SEC's authority to oversee the self regulatory
organizations).
88. This point was made by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in a case that
has now been overruled by Gilmer. See Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 228 n.6 (3rd Cir. 1989).
While the EEOC has participated in workshops to educate arbitrators in employment discrimination law,
it has no authority to regulate these associations.
89. In 1972, Congress amended Tide VII to authorize the EEOC to bring civil actions against
employers. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (citing Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972).
90. See infra Part I (discussing EEOC's authority under ADEA to bring enforcement actions).
91. See EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 979 F. Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The EEOC filed an
age discrimination suit under the ADEA, seeking back pay and liquidated damages on behalf of 17 former
Kidder, Peabody employees. Because the employees had signed a Form U-4, the court accepted Kidder,
Peabody's argument that the EEOC should be prevented from bringing suit. The court read Gilmer as
meaning that "the EEOC may not seek monetary relief on behalf of claimants who have entered into valid
arbitration agreements." Id. at 247.
92. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994); the 1991 Act, Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 26012654(1994).
93. See Testimony Before e Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relationsof the House Comm on Educ. and the
Worforce, 105th Cong. 3 (1998) (statement of David A. Cathcart, partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher in
L.A., Cal.). Because of these constraints, the EEOC staff isoverwhelmed with a backlog of cases. In May
1995, for example, the EEOC had only 761 investigators-i 16 fewer than it had in 1988-to investigate
an inventory of employment discrimination charges that eventually reached 111,000. See id at 6-7. See also
Darryl Van Duch, ParalysisforEEOC Feared, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 24, 1998, at Al.
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The Court found that this "flexibility" suggests that arbitration is
consistent with the statutory scheme.94 However, the ADEA only directs
the EEOC to utilize ADR "[b]efore instituting any action" under the
statute;95 the statute does not limit the EEOC's authority to eliminate
discrimination in the workplace by bringing actions in court. By
analogy, there is a difference between a federal agency consciously
choosing to utilize a nonbinding method of dispute resolution in an
effort to avoid a lawsuit on the one hand, and an individual being bound
by a standard form arbitration clause to forego adjudication on the
other.
Another assumption of the Gilmer Court relates to the voluntariness
of Mr. Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate. In assessing its validity, the
Gilmer Court, citing the FAA, ruled that the arbitration clause is
enforceable, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."96 In compelling arbitration, the Court
assumed that Gilmer, an "experienced businessman" was not "coerced
or defrauded" into agreeing to arbitrate his claims when he signed the
Form U-4. 97 This aspect of the Court's decision has been criticized as
reflecting indifference to the "obviously adhesive nature" of Mr.
Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate.98 One suspects that Mr. Gilmer never
read the arbitration clause contained in the standard form. But even if
he did read the form, the decision he faced was to sign the form and
submit to arbitration or choose another profession.99 In addition, the
Gilmer opinion suggests that the validity, or voluntariness, of the

94. The Court cited the section of the ADEA which directs the EEOC to utilize informal methods
ofconciliation and the like prior to instituting any action under the Act. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1990) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988)). The Court also made the related
point that arbitration allows employees a "broader right" to select the forum in which disputes are to be
resolved. Id
95. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1998).
96. See Gibnr, 500 U.S. at 33 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)).
97. Id.
98. See Gorman, supra note 81, at 650; see
also Maltby, supra note 81, at 8 (suggesting that for the
Court "[t]o imply that NYSE arbitration was the mutual desire of the parties is naive at best"); MACNE1L,
supra note 30, at 78-79 (commenting that the Court gave only "lip service" to any concern that Mr.
Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate may have been one-sided).
99. Since all registered brokers are required to sign the Form U-4, Mr. Gorman could not simply

take a job with another company. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing Form U-4
requirement). Indeed, the lack ofconsent inherent in the Form U-4 was observed by one federal court that
nonetheless upheld the agreement to arbitrate:
Even ifSmith Barney had explained the scope of the arbitration clause to the plaintiff, the
end result would have been the same; the execution of a Form U-4 isnot unique to Smith
Barney employees and it is not optional. It is an SEC industry-wide requirement, a
prerequisite to registration with any securities firm.
Stone, supra note 44, at 1038 (quoting Bender v. Smith Barney Upham & Co., 789 F. Supp. 155, 159
(D.NJ. 1992)).
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agreement to arbitrate is to be determined by ordinary contract
principles, notwithstanding the fundamental nature of the statutory
rights that are at stake.'
The upshot of Gilmer is that an individual agreement to arbitrate
statutory discrimination claims is now generally found to be
enforceable.' Another outcome of Gilmer is that in the employment
discrimination area, the question of arbitrability has been treated
differently, depending on whether arbitration is pursuant to an
individual employment agreement (governed by Gilmer) or pursuant to
a collective bargaining agreement (governed by Gardner-Denver).
Although it is of course appropriate to take into account important
differences between labor arbitration and arbitration under the FAA, it
is questionable whether a mandatory, standard form individual
employment agreement to arbitrate is any more consensual than a
collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate statutory discrimination
claims. 0 2
One question that the Court did not address in Gilmer was whether
the outcome would have been the same if Mr. Gilmer's claim had arisen
under Title VII or the ADA, rather than the ADEA. °3 Perhaps more
significantly, the Court's decision in Gilmer did not take into account the
1991 Act, which was enacted several months after Gilmer was decided.
The Supreme Court issued its decision in Gilmer on May 19, 1991,
which was after the 1991 Act was drafted and the committee reports
relating to the Act were issued, but six months before the Act was passed
and signed into law by President Bush. Thus Gilmer was decided in
between the drafting and final passage of section 118. I°
Until recently, circuit courts followed Gilmer without considering
whether arbitration was consistent with the history or purpose of the

100. Professor Gorman also questioned the Court's reference to common law fraud or
unconscionability as the proper standard for assessing the validity of an agreement to arbitrate statutory
employment discrimination claim. Se Gorman, supra note 81, at 652; see also Maltby, supra note 81, at 10
(arguing that the agreement to arbitrate discrimination claims should be "knowing and voluntary"). The
argument that the agreement to arbitrate discrimination claims should be subject to a heightened
voluntariness standard is further elaborated in Part II.D below.
101. Se cases cited inira note 105.
102. A standard form, mandatory arbitration agreement is not necessarily more likely to protect the
employees' statutory interests than a collective bargaining agreement. See Shell, supra note 15, at 566-72
(arguing that Title VII claims should not be arbitrable). Nor do the differences between labor and
employment arbitration necessarily mean that employment arbitration is more likely to be fair. Indeed,
one authority recently commented that, while labor arbitration is perceived as a "model of fairness,"
employment arbitration iscontroversial, apparently because there is greater variability in the fairness and
overall quality of employment arbitrations than labor arbitrations. Lisa Bingham, Emerging Due Process
Concerns in Emplyrent Arbitration: A Look at Actual Cases, 47 LABOR LJ. 108, 118 (1996).
103. Seesupra note 15 (discussing difference between Title VII and the ADEA).
104. For the text of§ 118, see supra note 13.
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1991 Act. 5 Some circuit courts, although not addressing the statutory
interpretation issue, have limited the impact of Gilmer by denying
enforcement of arbitration agreements on other grounds.' 0 6 One
particularly notable case limiting Gilmer is Cole v. Bums InternationalSecurity
Sewices. °7 In Cole, the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted Gilmer as
mandating the enforcement of only those mandatory arbitration
agreements that do not undermine the statutory scheme, for example,
by providing for payment by the employer of arbitrator fees and
allowing limited judicial review of arbitrator awards. 0 8
A few circuits, while not addressing the exact issue discussed in
Duffield and Seus, have considered the text and legislative history of
section 118 in determining the arbitrability of discrimination claims
since Gilmer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
upheld the arbitrability of an ADA claim under a collective bargaining
agreement, citing section 118 in support of its holding. 9 The Ninth
Circuit adopted a different interpretation in a case it decided prior to
Duffield, citing section 118 and its legislative history in support of the
proposition that an agreement to arbitrate Title VII claims must be
"knowing.""10 Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit interpreted identical language in the ADA to condone a
voluntary, predispute agreement to arbitrate an ADA claim in a case
outside of the employment context.]"
In May 1998, the Ninth Circuit decided Duffield, holding for the first
time since Gilmer that a nonconsensual agreement to arbitrate Title VII

105. See, e.g., Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991) (decided prior to
passage of 1991 Act); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991) (upon remand
from Supreme Court, applied Gimer,decided prior to passage of 1991 Act); Bender v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11 th Cir. 1992); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F. 3d
1482 (10th Cir. 1994); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997).
106. See Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1059 (11th Cir. 1998) (refusing to
enforce an arbitration agreement that court found to be "woefully deficient" by using confusing language
and providing for limited damage recovery); Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126,
1131 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that agreement to arbitrate ADA and Title VII claims lacked consideration);
Farrand v. Lutheran Bros., 993 F.2d 1253, 1255 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that NASD arbitration
procedures did not require arbitration of employment disputes); cf Halligan v. PiperJaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d
197,203 (2d Cir. 1998) (reversing decision of arbitration panel on grounds that it ignored "overwhelming
evidence" of discrimination).
107. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
108. Seeid. at 1468.
109. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 882 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Even
if the provisions of the legislative history are contrary to the statute, the statute must prevail.").
110. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994).
111. See Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141 (1st Cir. 1998) (upholding voluntary
agreement to arbitrate ADA claims between a private school and the parents of a student). As this article
was going to press, the First Circuit issued an opinion interpreting § 118 to allow arbitration of at least some
employment discrimination claims. Se supra note 18.
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claims is not enforceable. InJune 1998, the Third Circuit decided Seus,
reaching the opposite conclusion. Both opinions considered the
question of how Congress's passage of section 118 affects the Supreme
Court's holding in Gilmer. The circuits' respective interpretations of
section 118 are discussed in Part II below.
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF THE 1991 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

The histories of Duffield and Seus are very similar. Both Tonja
Duffield and Sheila Seus were employed by brokerage firms- Robertson Stephens and John Nuveen, respectively. Both women signed a
Form U-4 arbitration agreement" 2 as part of their registration to
become securities representatives, as required by SEC rules and the
terms of their employment. Ms. Duffield and Ms. Seus later brought
actions against their respective employers on grounds of discrimination
in violation of Title VII. The defendant employer in each case sought
to compel arbitration of the dispute under the FAA, relying on the
existence of a signed Form U-4 arbitration agreement. The district
court in each case dismissed the complaint and compelled arbitration
under the FAA, and both women appealed their respective dismissals.
Finally, in each case, the EEOC filed an amicus brief in support of the
employee's position. In Seus, however, the Third Circuit upheld the
dismissal of the district court whereas in Duffield, the Ninth Circuit
reversed. The decision in each case revolved around the circuit courts'
differing interpretations of section 118 of the 1991 Act.
A. Text
In upholding arbitration of Ms. Seus's Title VII claim, the Third
Circuit found that section 118113 of the 1991 Act "evinces a clear
Congressional intent to encourage arbitration" of statutory discrimina-

112. The text of Paragraph 5 of the Form U-4 reads as follows:
I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my
firm, or a customer, or any other person, that isrequired to be arbitrated under the rules,
constitutions, or by-laws of the organizations with which I register, as indicated in item 10
as may be amended from time to time.
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1998), cer. dnied, 119 S. Ct. 445
(1998). Ms. Duffield applied for registration with both the National Association of Securities Dealers and
the New York Stock Exchange, seei at 1185, whereas Ms. Seus registered only with the NASD, seeSeus
v.John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 1998), eat daid, 1999 WL 80340 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1999).
113. The text of§ 118 isexcerpted supra at note 13.
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tion claims of the sort brought by Ms. Seus." 4 Notwithstanding
Supreme Court precedent reading exceptions into the FAA for public
law statutes, including Title VII, the Seus court reasoned that to read any
limitation into section 118 would be tantamount to finding an "implied
repealer" to the FAA itself."5 The court, having found that the text was
"clear" and a "straightforward declaration of the full Congress,""6
''
dismissed the legislative history as insufficient to suggest any alternate
interpretation of section 118.
However, not only the Ninth Circuit, but also other circuit courts,
have interpreted section 118 as something other than a "clear"
endorsement of arbitration." 7 The text of section 118 states that
Congress did not encourage the use of alternate dispute resolution to
resolve Title VII disputes in all circumstances, but only "where appropriate" and "to the extent authorized by law." The Ninth Circuit in
Duffield read these words as meaning that Congress set definite limitations on the situations where arbitration could be utilized to resolve
claims under Tide VII." 8 Although the court in Seus found that the
words "where appropriate" should be read in reference to the FAA," 9
these differing interpretations suggest at the very least that the text of
section 118 is ambiguous.
Contrast section 118 with the type of explicit language that Congress
used when it wished to make clear that infringement claims brought
under the Patent Act are arbitrable. In 1982, Congress amended the
Patent Act to overrule the holdings of courts that refused to enforce

114. Seus, 146 F.3d at 182. This is also the interpretation adopted by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Austin v. Ouwens-Broclasy Glass Container,Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 881 (4th Cir.
1996) (stating that the language of the 1991 Act "could not be any more clear in showing Congressional
favor towards arbitration").
115. Seus, 146 F.3d at 179. The Supreme Court has never suggested that finding a statutory right
not arbitrable would amount to a repeal of the FAA. The Court in Mitsubishi discussed the interrelation
between the FAA and other public law statutes:
Just as it is the congressional policy manifested in the Federal Arbitration Act that requires
courts liberally to construe the scope ofarbitration agreements covered by that Act, it is the
congressional intention expressed in some other statute on which the courts must rely to
identify any category of claims as to which agreements to arbitrate will be held
unenforceable.
Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985). For a discussion of the evolution
of Supreme Court doctrine on arbitrability of statutory rights, see infta Part I.
116. Seus, 146 F.3d at 183.
117. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing § 118 as a
"polite bow to the popularity of 'alternate dispute resolution"); Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d
141, 150 (1st Cir. 1998) (reading § 118 as an endorsement of voluntayy arbitration while suggesting that
arbitration might not be appropriate in other contexts, such as employment).
118. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denid, 119
S. Ct. 445 (1998).
119. ee Sws, 146 F.3dat 183.
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arbitration clauses to resolve disputes involving patent validity or
infringement. 2 ' The text of the amendment is as follows:
A contract involving a patent or any right under a patent may contain
a provision requiring arbitration of any dispute relating to patent
validity or infringement arising under the contract. In the absence of
such a provision, the parties to an existing patent validity or infringement dispute may agree in writing to settle such dispute by arbitration. Any such provision or agreement shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, except for any
grounds that exist at law or equity for
2
revocation of a contract.' '
The language of the amendment is unambiguous, providing without
qualification that arbitration is permissible and explicitly stating that the
enforceability of any such arbitration clause shall be determined by
common law contract principles. Section 118, by contrast, is a qualified,
generalized statement in support of the use of ADR in the resolution of
discrimination disputes. Indeed, a minority of Republican congressmen
in the judiciary Committee, in their comments on what became section
118, complained that section 118 did little to help employers; in other
words, section 118 fell short of the type of clear authorization
of binding
22
arbitration that was contained in the Patent Act.
Not only is the language of section 118 qualified, but given the nature
of the 1991 Act, it would seem that the phrase "where appropriate"
should be read with the purpose of protecting victims of discrimination,
rather than with reference to the FAA as the court in Seus held. As the
court in Duffeld pointed out, it would seem that the section 118 should
be interpreted to provide potential plaintiffs with alternative fora in
which to
resolve disputes, not to "forc[e] an unwanted forum on
23
them."'
Distinguished scholarship on statutory interpretation supports the
Ninth Circuit's approach. Cass Sunstein has argued that statutory
interpretation should be guided by interpretive norms as an alternative
120. Congress overruled the holdings in Z pManufactwring Co. v. Pep ManufacturingCo., 44 F.2d 184,
186 (D. Del. 1930) and Beclnan Instuments, Inc. v. Technical Deveopments Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1965).
See H.R. REP. No. 97-542, at 12 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 765, 776.
121. 37 U.S.C. § 294(a) (1994). The amendment also requires that notice of arbitrator awards be
given to the Patent Commissioner. See id.
§ 294(d).
122.

See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 pt. II, at 78 (1991), vprontdin 1991 U.S.C.CAN. 694, 764 (dissenting

views ofcongressmen Hyde, Coble, McCollum, Moorhead, Sensenbrenner, Gekas, Slaughter, Smith, and
Ramstad in the report of thejudiciary Committee). In discussing § 118, while agreeing that mediation and
arbitration are preferable to litigation, the dissenting congressmen described § 118 as "an empty promise
which is [sic] no way will assist claimants or employers in the resolution of such claims." Id. The quoted
language suggests that even conservative members of Congress interpreted § 118 to be an endorsement of
Gandner-Doner.
123. SeeDuffied, 144 F.3d at 1194.
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to excessive focus, for example, on the "plain meaning" of a statute.' 24
One such norm is the idea that, where a statute is ambiguous, a court
should interpret it in favor of disadvantaged groups.'25 He reasons that
those responsible for implementing the statute may do so inadequately,
as a result of the same prejudices that the statute may have been
intended to address.' 26 As an example, Sunstein cites cases applying
disparate impact doctrine as a basis for finding discrimination under
Title VII, and argues that, given "systemic barriers to the implementation of antidiscrimination statutes," the relatively pro-plaintiff test
outlined in Grigs v. Duke Power was a better method of implementing
Title VII than the standard elaborated in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio.'27 Applying this norm to section 118, the qualifier "where
appropriate" should be interpreted in a manner that will advance the
implementation of the antidiscrimination statutes--by allowing potential
plaintiffs more options rather than fewer for enforcing their rights.
The second limitation that Congress included in section 118 is
perhaps even more ambiguous than the first. When section 118
provides that the use of ADR is encouraged "to the extent authorized by
law," it is unclear whether the statute is referring to the state of the law
before or after Gi/mer. As the court in Duffield observed, at the time that
section 118 was drafted, the prevailing law was that arbitration of
statutory employment discrimination claims could not supplant judicial
process: "Even as arbitration became increasingly popular in the
1980's, every circuit court to address the issue held firm in refusing to
enforce any agreement-in the collective bargaining context or
otherwise-that required employees to resolve discrimination claims
through binding arbitration." 2 ' In addition, the legislative history to the
1991 Act demonstrates that Congress emphatically rejected a Republican proposal that would have expressly allowed for the type of binding
124. Sunstein suggests that even adherence to the apparent "plain meaning" of a statute is policyladen: "An interpretive strategy that relies exclusively on the ordinary meaning of words is precisely
that-a strategy that reflects a choice among competing possibilities-and it will sometimes produce
irrationality or injustice that the legislature did not intend." Cass Sunstein, InterpretingSiatutes in a Regukloty
State, 103 HARV. L REV. 407, 424 (1989)t
125. The Supreme Court itself has held that civil rights legislation should be interpreted liberally in
order to effectuate its remedial purpose. See,
&g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991) (holding that
§ 1983 must be "liberally and beneficently" construed).
126. S&e
Sunstein, supra note 124, at 483.
127. See ii at 483-85. In t4gs v. Duke iwer Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the landmark case that first
established the disparate impact doctrine, the Court held that once a plaintiff demonstrates discriminatory
impact of a business practice, to avoid liability the employer must show that it was justified by "business
necessity." The second, more recent case was overruled with the passage of the 1991 Act. SeeWards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 643-44 (1989) (holding that the employer need only produce evidence
showing that an allegedly discriminatory practice serves the employer's "legitimate employment goals").
128. DuffLd, 144 F.3d at 1188.
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arbitration that is prohibited by Gardner-Denver.'29 However, the court
in Seus makes a compelling point in this regard-even if a court were to
accept the view that section 118 intended to "freeze" or codify the
existing state of the law, the Supreme Court decided Gilmer in May
1991, six months before the 1991 Act was passed. 3 Notwithstanding. this
problem, the fact that Gardner-Denverrepresented the law on arbitrability
of Title VII claims at the time section 118 was drafted 3 ' provides
important context within which to interpret the arbitrability question.
B. Legislative Histoty
In Seus, the court noted the legislative history of section 118 but
dismissed it as conflicting with what the court interpreted to be the plain
meaning of the statute."' The Duffield court, on the other hand, found
that "it is the unusual force and clarity of the statute's legislative history
that is ultimately dispositive in this case.""'3

The Ninth Circuit

elaborated by citing to the Committee Report on the bill which became
the 1991 Act. In the report, the House Committee on Education and
the Workforce explained that the purpose of section 118 was "to
increase the possible remedies available to civil rights plaintiffs" and
emphasized that an arbitration agreement "does not preclude the affected
personfrom seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII." 34 The
Committee also stated that its view was consistent with Gardner-Denver.'35
In short, the reading of section 118 elaborated in the committee report
states unequivocally that any predispute agreement to arbitrate is not
binding; that is, it does not preclude resort to a judicial remedy. This
interpretation of section 118 would "encourage" the use of ADR, not in
place of, but only in addition to judicial remedies to enforce the
antidiscrimination statutes.' 36

129. Seeid at 1196.
130. See Seus v.John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 183 (3d Cir. 1998), cL denied, 1999 WL 80340
(U.S. Feb. 22, 1999).
131. Indeed, the legislative history to the 1991 Act expressly cites Gardnr-Dweras being consistent
with the intended meaning of§ 118. See infia note 134 and accompanying text.
132.
&e
Seus, 146 F.3d at 182-83.
133. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1195.
134. See id (quoting H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at97 (1991), repriidin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
635 (emphasis added)). The report of the Committee on the Judiciary contains similar language. See H.R.
REP. No. 102-40, pt. II, at 41 (1991), reprinte in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 735.
135. See H.R. REP. No.102-40, pt. I, at 97 (1991), norinke in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635.
136. The court in Duffeld, however, does not go so far as to hold that any predispute agreement to
arbitrate is unenforceable. The court only invalidated an agreement that was compulsory, ie.,
entered into
as a condition of employment, and left open the question ofwhether voluntary, predispute agreements to
arbitrate Title VII claims are valid. See Duffuld, 144 F.3d at 1187.
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The use of legislative history to interpret a statute has drawn a
considerable amount of controversy,137 particularly when the statute at
issue is politically divisive, as was the 1991 Act. 38 Notwithstanding the
controversy, however, when the issue is determining the arbitrability of
statutory rights, Mitsubishi,McMahon and even Gilmer direct that a court
examine the legislative history of the given statute to determine whether
arbitration would conflict with the statutory scheme. 3 ' Indeed, unlike
the legislative histories of the 1934 Act and ADEA (at issue McMahon
and Gilmer, respectively) the committee report on section 118 expressly
refutes any suggestion that the statute should be construed to allow
arbitration in lieu ofjudicial remedy.'"
The only weakness to the Duffield court's reliance on legislative history
is the fact that, during floor debate prior to the 1991 Act's passage,
Senator Bob Dole and Congressman Henry Hyde each submitted into
the record an interpretive memorandum on section 118 that is not
consistent with the interpretation of section 118 set forth in the
committee reports. Each memorandum interpreted section 118 as
encouraging the use of "binding" arbitration and other forms of ADR,
and cited Gi/mer in support of the use of binding arbitration.' 4 ' Even the
text of the interpretive memoranda, however, limits its support of

137. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative Histoy in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
845,845 n.1 (1991); Robert Post,,justiceforScal/a N.Y. REV. OFBOOKS,June i1, 1998, at 57 (discussing
and critiquingJustice Scalia's opposition to the use of legislative history); Richard A. Posner, Economics,
Politics,and the Readingof Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 274-75 (1982) (suggesting that
committee reports and floor statements of sponsors of a bill may reflect the "deal" struck by Congress in
enacting legislation); WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE,JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 221-25 (citing
reliability, historicist and formalist critiques of the Supreme Court's extensive reliance on legislative history
during the 1970s and 1980s).
138. See infra note 187 (discussing divisiveness of 1991 Act). See also Breyer, supra note 137, at 856
(noting that the use oflegislative history to interpret a statute that has "evoked strong political support and
opposition in Congress" is particularly controversial as it risks "elevating the testimony to the level of a
statute").

139. The Duffeld court cites this as "perhaps the most compelling reason" for ruling the way it did.
144 F.3d at 1198.
140. In terms of its legislative history, the 1991 Act is very different from the ADEA which was
analyzed in Gibner. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1990) ("Gilmer
concedes that nothing in the text of the ADEA or its legislative history explicitly precludes arbitration.").
The legislative history of the 1991 Act is also distinguishable from that of the 1934 Act at issue in
McMahon. In McMahon, the plaintiffs argued that the legislative history of amendments to the 1934 Act
stated explicitly that the amendment did not change existing law as reflected in Widko. Se
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 237 (1986). The Court rejected this
argument as "fraught with difficulties," as there was nothing in the 1934 Act that even remotely addressed
arbitrability. Id The Court reasoned that the committee report failed to articulate the committee's views
on what "existing law" provided. Id. In contrast, the committee report to the 1991 Act clearly states its
views of what existing law provided. In addition, the 1991 Act expressly addresses arbitrability.
141. 137 CONG. REc. S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole); 137 CONG. REc.
H9548 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
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arbitration to situations where the parties "knowingly and voluntarily"
elect to use such methods." 2
Examining the legislative history thus yields two insights into the
apparent intent of the legislators who passed the 1991 Act. The first is
that the consensus emerging from both the Committee on Education
and Labor and the Judiciary Committee interpreted section 118 to
mean that a predispute agreement to arbitrate never precludes resort to
a judicial remedy." 3 The second is that even the minority Republican
members of Congress who opposed the bill that became the 1991 Act
were in favor of legislation that allowed for the enforcement of binding
arbitration agreements, but only where "knowing and voluntary."'
C. Overall Purpose
The court in Seus based its holding on what it perceived to be the
plain meaning of section 118, whereas the Duffield court relied heavily
on the statute's legislative history. McMahon directs, however, that
congressional intent to preclude arbitration may be discernible not only
from the text or history of a statute, but also "from an inherent conflict
between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes."' 45 As
discussed above, the Supreme Court in Gilmer found that arbitration of
142. The interpretive memorandum reads as follows:
SECTION 118. ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
This provision encourages the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including
binding arbitration, where the parties wingo and vohmtarUy ect to usethese
methods.
In light of the litigation crisis facing this country and the increasing sophistication and
reliability of alternatives to litigation, there is no reason to disfavor the use of such forums.
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991).
137 CONG. REC. H9505, H9548 (1991) (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (emphasis
added). Although the memorandum cites to Gibner, it only does so for the proposition that arbitration
agreements should be enforced if made "knowingly and voluntarily." See
id
143. Traditionally, reliance on committee reports is considered less controversial than reliance on
the floor statements of individual legislators. See, e.g.,
ESKRIDGE, supra note 137, at 222 fig.7.1 (citing
committee reports as "most authoritative" in the hierarchy of legislative history sources).
144. It is somewhat ironic that the Republican bill, H.R. 1375, contained explicit language requiring
that arbitration agreements be consensual. The relevant text of the bill reads as follows: "Where knowingly
and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reasonable alternative means of dispute resolution, including
binding arbitration, shall be encouraged in place of thejudicial resolution of disputes arising under this Act
and the Acts amended by this Act." H.R. 1375, 102d Cong. § 12 (1991). The fact that Congress rejected
the language in H.R. 1375 referring to consensual, but binding, arbitration in favor of more general
language further suggests that Congress interpreted § 118 in a manner consistent with Gardner-Denver. See
a/so Statement of George Bush upon signing S.1745, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1701 (Nov. 25, 1991)
(noting that § 118 of the 1991 Act encourages "voluntary" arbitration and mediation agreements between
employers and employees).
145. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1986) (citing Mitsubishi
Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 632-37 (1985)); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,
470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985).
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Mr. Gilmer's age discrimination claim would not conflict with the
purposes underlying the ADEA.'" Yet the 1991 Act, unlike the ADEA,
was enacted with the express purpose of expanding the remedies available
to address intentional discrimination and responding to recent Supreme
Court decisions which had cut back on protection to victims of
discrimination.'47 As Chief'Judge Posner of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed, in a case arising out of an
arbitration clause contained in a collective bargaining agreement:
It would be at least a mild paradox for Congress, having in another
amendment that it made to Title VII in 1991 conferred a right to trial
by jury for the first time, to have empowered unions, in those same
amendments, to prevent workers from obtaining jury trials in these
cases. 148

The Seventh Circuit thus recognized that an agreement to submit
discrimination claims to arbitration, imposed without the.consent of the
employee, would conflict with a purpose of the 1991 Act-affording
149
victims of intentional discrimination the right to a jury trial.
In addition to providing the right to a jury trial, the 1991 Act modifies
the law in other ways that benefit victims of discrimination: (1) it allows
a plaintiff to recover compensatory damages, for other than backpay, as
well as punitive damages in cases involving intentional discrimination
under Title VII and the ADA; 5 ° (2) it establishes that an unlawful
employment practice may be established under Title VII on the basis of
disparate impact under a Griggs-type standard;' 5 ' (3) it allows a
successful plaintiff to recover expert fees as well as attorneys' fees;' 52 and
(4) it clarifies that Title VII and the ADA cover discrimination by U.S.controlled employers located outside the territory of the United States. 5 '
The Act's purpose to facilitate private enforcement of the
antidiscrimination statutes is unambiguous. 5 4 It would, defeat this

146. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text (discussing Gilmer).

147. See 1991 Act §3.
148. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing 1991 Act § 102).
149. Although Pynerinvolved labor arbitration and not an individual employment agreement, Judge
Posner recognized that mandatory arbitration clauses pose a similar, albeit "attenuated," lack ofconsent
problem as that raised in the collective bargaining context. See PFyner, 109 F.3d at 364 (noting that in
Gilmer, Mr. Gilmer's employer had forced him, as a condition to his employment, to agree to NYSE
arbitration).

150. See 1991 Act § 102. In addition to backpay, the Act allows for damages for future pecuniary loss
as well as nonpecuniary loss such as pain and suffering, subject to a cap. Seeid § 102(b)(3).
151. See it § 105.
152. Seeid.§113.
153. Seeid.§ 109.
154. Even textualists such asJustice Scalia consider the overall text of the statute as relevant, and

would decline an interpretation of a provision that conflicts with other parts of the statute. See ESKRIDGE,

472

UNIVERSIT OF CLINCINNATI IA WREVIEW

[Vol.67

purpose to allow employers to force employees to agree to replace a
judicial forum with one that is subject to the employers' control.
From its beginning, Title VII emphasized the private right of action
as the mechanism for enforcement.'55 The thrust of the 1991 Act, as the
text of the statute expressly acknowledges, is to expand plaintiff remedies
for discrimination to encourage vigorous enforcement of the statute.
The Act accomplishes this by allowing the right to a jury trial, allowing
compensatory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination, and
returning to a Griggs-type standard for proving a Title VII violation
under disparate impact doctrine. It would be perverse to interpret
section 118 in a manner that allows an employer to force employees to
submit their disputes to a private forum, not because the private forum
is necessarily inadequate, but because the overall purpose of the statute
requires that the thumb be on the employees' side of the scale by allowing
them a genuine, informed choice of forum in which to resolve discrimination claims.
D. Relevance ofAgency Interpretation
In both Duffield and Seus, the EEOC filed an amicus brief urging
dismissal.' 56 The court in Duffield took account of the weight to be given
to the EEOC's "reasonable" interpretation of the 1991 Act'57 whereas
the court in Seus did not.
The Supreme Court has been inconsistent on the degree to which
EEOC interpretations should be accorded deference. In EEOC v.
ArabianAmerican Oil Co. (Aramco),'58 a majority of the Court declined from
adopting the EEOC's position that Tide VII should apply extraterritorially to prohibit discrimination by a U.S. employer operating abroad

supra note 137, at 226-27 (noting thatJustice Scalia "admits 'coherence' arguments, that is, arguments that
an ambiguous term is rendered clear if one possible definition ismore coherent with the surrounding legal
terrain than other possible definitions"); seealso Post, supra note 137, at 57 (discussing ANTONIN SCALIA
ET AL., A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) ("Scalia readily
acknowledges that if the meaning of a text is unclear, 'the principal determinant of meaning iscontext."').
155. Seesupra notes 49-53 (discussing Gardner-Denver).
156. See Duffleld v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 445 (1998); Seus v.John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1997), cat denied, 1999 WL
80340 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1999). In addition, as discussed below, the EEOC in 1997 issued a policy statement
i4a notes 167opposing the use of mandatory arbitration to resolve employment discrimination claims. See
70 and accompanying text.
157. Se DuffiWd, 144 F.3d at 1190 n.6 (deferring to the EEOC position on mandatory arbitration to
the extent that it represents a reasonable interpretation of Tide VII).
158. 499 U.S. 244 (1990).
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against a U.S. employee.' 59 However, asJustice Scalia pointed out in a
concurring opinion, the Court had previously recognized that EEOC
interpretations of ambiguous statutes "need only be reasonable in order
to be entitled to deference."' 6 ° Thus, in Aramco,Justice Scalia suggested
that as a general matter the EEOC should be accorded the degree of
deference otherwise extended to agency determinations under Chevron
US.A. v. NaturalResource Defense Council. 6 '
Judicial deference to the EEOC's interpretation of the 1991 Act
makes sense as a matter of policy. In his book on statutory interpretation, William Eskridge observes how statutes tend to be construed over
time from a "bottom up" perspective-that is, taking into account not
only the interpretation of the agency charged with the enforcement of
the statute, but also developments that occur at the ground level, rather
than the top of the agency's hierarchy.'62 Eskridge explains that looking
at law from this perspective "reveals the cultural and political struggle
for meaning" behind statutory interpretation issues.163 He provides as
an example the EEOC's role in "dynamic" interpretation of Tide VII
during the 1960s. From Tide VII's inception, "key players" in the
EEOC realized that plaintiffs could make out a case of discrimination,
even when there was no tangible evidence of actual intent to discriminate, by presenting statistical evidence of underrepresentation.' 64 The
EEOC took the position that, in cases where hard evidence of discriminatory intent was lacking, the best way to carry out the purpose of Tide
VII was to permit victims of discrimination to prove a violation by
presenting evidence of discriminatory impact.' 65 This position, which
was shared by the NAACP Legal Education and Defense Fund,
persuaded the Griggs
court to employ disparate impact doctrine to
66
enforce Tide VII.1

Similarly, a controversy over mandatory arbitration has developed
during the years since Gilmer was decided. On the agency level, the

159.

Congress overruled this aspect ofAratmcowhen it passed the 1991 Act. See1991 Act § 109(a), 42

U.S.C. § 12111(4) (1994) (amending the definition for "employee" under Title
VII and the ADA to include,
"[w]ith respect to employment in a foreign country," any U.S. citizen).

160. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 260 (Scalia,J., concurring) (quoting EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods.
Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988)).
161. See id at 259 (ScaliaJ., concurring). In Chavm USA., Inc. v. Natural Resource
Defense Couni4 Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme Court held that a court may not substitute its own interpretation of a
statute for that of an administrative agency, so long as the administrative interpretation is "reasonable."
Id at 844.
162. Se ESKRIDGE, supra note 137, at 71.
163. Seeid at 72.
164. Seeid. at 73.
165. See id.

166. See id at 73-74.
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EEOC, as well as other agencies that have dealt with the issue, have
questioned whether mandatory arbitration is appropriate in the
employment discrimination context. InJuly 1997, the EEOC issued a
detailed, formal notice of its position that mandatory agreements to
arbitrate statutory discrimination claims are inconsistent with the
intention of the antidiscrimination statutes. 167 Citing the "profound
importance" of the law against discrimination,'68 and citing the private
right of action as "an essential part of the statutory enforcement
scheme,"' 69 the EEOC asserts that the use of mandatory, predispute
agreements to arbitrate discrimination claims harms both the individual
employee and the public interest in eliminating discrimination in the
workplace. 7 ' Indeed, the EEOC's position regarding mandatory
arbitration goes further than the holding in Dufield, because the EEOC
opposes any predispute waiver of the right to a judicial forum whereas
the Ninth Circuit's holding invalidated only mandatory waivers imposed
as a condition to employment. 7 '
Other agencies that have dealt with the issue have also questioned the
use of mandatory arbitration to resolve discrimination claims. The
general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), for
example, issued an opinion in 1995 taking the position that requiring an
employee to sign an arbitration clause as a condition of employment is
an unfair labor practice.'72 Perhaps even more striking is the fact that
167. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Disputes as a Condition to Employment, No. 915.002 (July 10, 1997), availabe in LEXIS, BNA library,
DLABRT file [hereinafter EEOC Polity
Statement].
168. See i pt. II.
169. S id.
pt. IV.D.
170. See id pt. VII.
171. For example, in its amicus brief filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Duflid, the EEOC expressed its position as follows:
[T]he Commission fully supports the use of arbitration where dispute or claim to arbitration
where there is an existing dispute or claim and the employee voluntarily agrees to submit
that dispute or claim to arbitration
The problem in cases of this
nature is that arbitration is being "agreed" to, not in the
context of an existing dispute or claim, but in advance of any claim arising.
Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amiaus Curiae at 8, Duflield v. Robertson
Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-15698) [hereinafter EEOC Brief]. The EEOC's
position is understandable, as it would protect employees from agreeing to arbitration pre-dispute when the
employee is likely to underestimate the value of ajudicial forum. Interpreting § 118 to endorse only postdispute arbitration, however, conflicts with the Supreme Court's recent rulings on arbitrability. See supra
notes 76-102 and accompanying text.
172. See Bentley's Luggage Corp., No. 12-CA-16658, 1995 WL 912536 (N.L.R.B.G.C., Aug. 21,
1995). In June 1994, Bentley's required all of its employees to sign, as a condition to continued
employment, an arbitration clause. See i at *!.When Robert Letwin was fired for refusing to sign the
agreement, he filed a charge with the National Labor Review Board (NLRB). See
id. at *2. The NLRB
General Counsel found that the arbitration agreement violated § 8(a)(4) of the National Labor Relations
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the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) itself proposed
eliminating the arbitration requirement from its Form U-4, 73 which was
approved by the SEC and became effective January 1, 1999.174 In

approving the elimination of the mandatory arbitration requirement, the
SEC cited comment letters sent by New York's Attorney General and
the chairman of the EEOC, 175 and found that the antidiscrimination
statutes raise distinct issues: "The statutory employment anti-discrimination provisions reflect an express intention by legislators that
employees receive special protection from discriminatory conduct by
employers.... It is reasonable for the NASD to determine that in this

unique area, it will not, as a self-regulatory organization, require arbitration."' 76 It is notable that the SEC reacted to a public perception that
mandatory
arbitration is unsuitable for employment discrimination
177
claims.

Act, which provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee
for filing charges against the employer. Se id.
at *3. The General Counsel reasoned that the clause
deterred employees from filing charges with the NLRB by forcing them first to resort to Bentley's
arbitration procedure. See idL
More recently, the NLRB Chairman, William B. Gould, publicly expressed his concern regarding the
widespread use of mandatory arbitration agreements. See Arbitration:L NLRB Chirman Qutions Impartiali4
ofArbitfion inNowzion Wookilacou, 72 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Apr. 15, 1997 atA2, aailab/ein LEXIS, BNA
library, DLABRT file (stating that the NLRB "ought to be reluctant ...to defer to a procedure where only
one party establishes [and] pays for it").
173. The NASD formed an Advisory Committee that invited representatives of the public to
comment on the desirability of eliminating the mandatory arbitration requirement for statutory
discrimination claims. Self-Regulatory Commission Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-39,421,
62 Fed. Reg. 66,164, 66,166 (Dec. 10, 1997). The NASD filed the proposed change with the SEC in
October 1997, "in light of the public perception that civil rights claims may present important legal issues
better dealt with in ajudicial setting." Id (giving notice that the NASD filed with the SEC the proposed
rule change).
174. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40,109, 63 Fed. Reg. 35,299,
35,301 (Jun. 22, 1998) (approving the proposed rule change). Section 19(b)(2) of the 1934 Act requires the
SEC to approve a proposed rule change ifthe SEC determines that the proposed rule change is consistent
with 1934 Act standards. See irL
at 35,303. The NYSE recently submitted a similar proposed rule change
to the SEC which is still pending approval. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No.
34-40,479, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,782 (Oct. 1, 1998).
Note that the NASD rule change, like the proposed NYSE rule change, does not eliminate mandatory
arbitration clauses; it merely eliminates the arbitration requirement for NASD-registered securities
representatives. Therefore, the NASD rule change does not prevent Robertson Stephans and other
employers in the securities industry from including a mandatory arbitration clause in their emp/wynsn
contracts.
175. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40,109, 63 Fed. Reg. 35,299,
35,303 n.51 (Jun. 22, 1998).
176. &e id.
at 35,303 (emphasis added).
177. In addition to the comment letters from the EEOC and the Attorney General mentioned above,
the SEC also received a letter from a number of congressmen, expressing opposition to the use of
mandatory arbitration clauses and questioning the authority of self regulatory organizations to require the
arbitration of employment discrimination claims. See Self-Regulatory Commission Organizations, 62 Fed.
Reg. at 66,166 n.21 (citing Letter from Representatives EdwardJ. Markey, Anna G. Eshoo, andJesse L
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The perception that arbitration of public law rights should not be
imposed as a condition to employment is widespread, as evidenced by
a 1993 government study. In March 1993, the Secretaries of Labor and
Commerce established the Commission on the Future of WorkerManagement Relations, also known as the Dunlop Commission, to
report on a number of questions pertaining to relations between
management and employees, including the use of ADR to resolve
workplace disputes. The Dunlop Commission received testimony from
411 witnesses, consulted with the Department of Labor, the NLRB and
the EEOC, and reviewed over 160 studies, including statements
submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union, the U.S. Department
of Labor and the U.S. General Accounting Office."'8 In its final report,
the Commission emphasized the importance of public law rights, such
as freedom from discrimination in the workplace, and criticized the use
of mandatory arbitration agreements.' 79 The Commission also
advocated the enactment of legislation to clarify that the choice to utilize
arbitration to enforce statutory employment rights "should be left to the
individual who feels wronged rather than dictated by his or her
employment contract." 8 '
Even arbitration organizations have opposed the use of mandatory
arbitration to resolve statutory claims. The National Academy of
Arbitrators, a prominent association of labor law arbitrators, issued a
statement in May 1997, unequivocally opposing mandatory arbitration
of statutory claims.' 8 ' In May 1995, representatives of employer,
employee, and arbitration organizations formed a Task Force on
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment with the aim of
formulating a Due Process Protocol for resolution of statutory employment disputes."' The Task Force, however, was not able to reach
Jackson,Jr., to Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC (Feb. 3, 1997)).
178. Dunlop
Commission
Fnal
Report,
(visited
Jan.
28,
1999)
<http://www.ilr.comell.edu/ibrary/carchive/Dunlop/preface.html> [hereinafter Dunlop Report].
179. While urging employers to utilize voluntary ADR programs, the Commission stated that
"[e]mployees requbsd to accept binding arbitration ... would face what for many would be an inappropriate
choice:
give up your right to go to court, or give up your job."
DunlOP Report, at
<http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/library/e._archive/Dunlop/section4.html>.
180. Seid
181. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, STATEMENT AND GUIDEUNES OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBrrRATORS (1997) (copy on file with author). In the Guidelines, the Academy advises its

arbitrators that, notwithstanding the fact the current case law upholds the validity of mandatory arbitration
clauses, "the power to withdraw from a case in the face of policies, rules, or procedures that are manifestly
unfair or contrary to fundamental due process carries considerable moral suasion." Id.
182. The organizations represented, although the views expressed were the personal views of the
representatives and not the official views of the organizations, included the American Bar Association, the
National Academy of Arbitrators, the American Arbitration Association, the Society of Professionals in
Dispute Resolution, the National Employment Lawyers Association and the American Civil Liberties
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agreement on the appropriateness of mandatory arbitration of statutory
claims.' 83 Mandatory arbitration of statutory employment claims has
thus proved to be divisive even within the arbitration community.
In light of the groundswell of controversy over mandatory arbitration,
a number of Congressmen have called for an outright prohibition on the
use of predispute arbitration clauses to resolve discrimination claims. In
January 1997, Representative Edward Markey and Senator Russell
Feingold introduced proposed legislation, entitled the "Civil Rights
Procedures Protection Act of 1997," that would amend Title VII, the
ADA, the ADEA, and a number of other statutes protecting employment rights' 84 to eliminate the use of predispute, coerced agreements to
arbitrate claims arising under these statutes.' 85
By taking a position that protects potential victims of employment
discrimination, the agencies and organizations discussed in this section
considered the arbitrability issue from the "bottom up"-they, unlike
many judges, recognize that mandatory arbitration is not consistent with
the underlying purpose of the antidiscrimination statutes.
IV. PROPOSED VOLUNTARINESS STANDARD

This article proposes that courts should interpret section 118 in a
manner that balances Congress's acknowledgment of ADR's benefits-flexibility, speed, and efficiency-with a concern not to compromise the ability of employees to enforce their civil rights.'86 Considering
Union. See A Due Process Protocolfor Mediation andArbitration of Statutoy Disputes arisingout of the Employment
Relationship(visitedJan. 24, 1999) <http://www.adr.org/protocol.html>.
183. See id.
184. The legislation would also amend the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994), 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201-219 (1994), and the Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
185. See H.R. 983, 105th Congress §§ 1-10 (1997). Although at least 40 Representatives and three
Senators co-sponsored the bill, to date the bill has not been acted upon.
InJuly 1998, Senator Feingold, testifying before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs on the issue of mandatory arbitration in the securities industry, mentioned the Civil Rights
Procedures Act and noted that the following organizations had expressed support for the bill: The
Women's Legal Defense Fund, The Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the National
Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, the National Women's Law Center, the National Council of
La Raza, the Coalition of Labor Union Women, the National Employment Lawyers' Association, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the D.C. Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs and
Women Employed. See Testimony Before the Comm. on Ban4ng Hous. and UrbanAffairs, 105th Cong. 5 (1998)
(statement of Sen. Russell Feingold).
186. At least one circuit courtjudge has written about the need to critically assess the validity of such
arbitration clauses. In a recent article, Judge Cabranes of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit referred to the "acute" risks associated with unequal bargaining power in the context of
standard form arbitration clauses in employment contracts. SeeJos6 A. Cabranes, Arbitration and US. Courts:
Balancing Their Strengts, N.Y. ST. BJ. 22, 24 (Mar./Apr. 1998). He noted that employers enjoy the
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the fundamental nature of the rights at issue, a heightened standard of
voluntariness is necessary to prevent an employer, who is, after all, the
intended target of the discrimination statutes, from diluting its exposure
to liability by fashioning an arbitral forum and then forcing the
employee to agree to it.
Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the passage of the 1991
Act, 187 even if one failed to consider the conference reports cited in
Duffeld but looked only to the statements of the Republican congressmen
and President Bush, who initially vetoed the 1991 Act, even these
expressly limited the language of section 118 to encourage only
"voluntary" agreements to arbitrate discrimination claims.' 88 In other
words, the understanding among legislators that section 118 does not
endorse nonconsensual arbitration appears to have been virtually
unanimous.
A heightened voluntariness standard for agreements to arbitrate
discrimination claims makes sense from a policy perspective. As a
general matter, thejudiciary's embrace of arbitration is understandable.
Even those who oppose mandatory arbitration agree that voluntary,
post-dispute arbitration nonetheless should be encouraged to resolve
employment disputes.'89 This article does not address how arbitration
compares with the courts in resolving statutory claims. The issue
emphasized here, rather, is one of bargaining power. The relationship,
for example, between a corporate employer and a disabled employee is
one in which the need to protect against an adhesive agreement to
arbitrate is manifest.
As neither the FAA, nor the antidiscrimination statutes, expressly
limit the content of arbitration agreements, 90 employers, in an effort to

advantage of being a "repeat player," and therefore suggested a need to give such clauses a "more rigorous
level ofjudicial scrutiny." Id
187. President Bush vetoed the first version of the Act passed by Congress in 1990. The legislative
history of the 1991 Act for the part of the statute that redefines the test for proving disparate impact is so

contradictory that a section was added to the 1991 Act, expressly limiting the legislative history on this issue
to an agreed-upon interpretive memorandum. See1991 Act § 105(b), Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071,
1075 (1991)
188. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
189. e, e.g.,Maltby, supra note 81, at 2 (arguing that arbitration-where "knowing and voluntary"
and subject to certain due process standards-"could be a blessing" for providing individuals the possibility
of reasonably inexpensive access tojustice); Dunlop Commission Report, supra note 178, § IV(3) (finding
that "high-quality alternatives to litigation hold the promise ofexpanding access to public law rights for
lower-wage workers" and may also allow disputes to be resolved "without permanently fracturing the
employee's working relationship with the employer"); EEOC Poify Statkman, supra note 167, pt. VI
(affirming the EEOC's "strong support" ofvoluntary ADR programs that are entered into after a dispute
has arisen).
190. The FAA's only requirement, other than the requirements for any enforceable contract, is that
the agreement to arbitrate be in writing. See
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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limit potential liability under the antidiscrimination statutes, draft
arbitration clauses that have the effect of diluting the rights and
remedies available to plaintiffs under these statutes.' 9 ' A glaring
example of this practice is illustrated in the recent case HootersofAmerica,
Inc. v. Annette Phillips.92 In 1994, Hooters management developed a socalled "open door policy" pursuant to which each employee was
requested, as a condition to receiving future promotion within the
company,'93 to sign an arbitration agreement pursuant to Hooters's inhouse "Rules." The company Rules, among other things, allow for only
Hooters to draw up the list of potential arbitrators, 94 impose limits on
any backpay or frontpay to be awarded to claimants,' 95 limit punitive
damages to less than five percent of what is allowed under Title VII, 96
allow for attorneys' fees to be awarded only upon a showing of "frivolity
or bad faith" of the unsuccessful litigant,' 97 and alter the burden of proof
provided for under Title VII.' 9' Although in Hooters, the terms of the
arbitration clause were egregious enough for the court to invalidate the
agreement, there are more subtle forms of unfairness that exist in the
drafting and execution of the arbitration clause that may be difficult for
the employee to prove, particularly under a common law contract test.
Rather than presuming consent to arbitrate, a stricter standard is
necessary-one that will have the effect of shifting the99burden of proving
voluntariness to, or at least towards, the employer.'
A state statute that attempted to set any limitations on arbitration would most likely be held to be
preempted by the FAA. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,688 (1996) (invalidating a
Montana statutory requirement that any arbitration clause be written in capital letters, underlined and
placed on the first page of the contract).
191. In its policy statement announcing the EEOC policy on mandatory arbitration, the EEOC
noted that employers have included clauses that, among other things, (i) impose filing deadlines shorter than
those allowed under the statute; (ii) limit damages to "out of pocket" expenses; (iii) deny attorneys' fees to
a prevailing claimant; (iv)prohibit the award ofpunitive damages; (v)deny the right to discovery; and (vi)
require the employee to pay one-half of the arbitrators' fees or, in the event that the employer prevails, all
of the fees. See EEOC Po/icy Statmnt, supra note 167, pt. V.B. n. 18.
192. No. 4:96-3360-22, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3962 (D.S.C., Mar. 12, 1988).
193. According to a Hooters employee, a Hooters executive instructed managers to "find a reason
to get rid of' any employee who refused to sign the arbitration agreement. Id. at *39. In effect, therefore,
the agreement was imposed as a condition to employment.
194. Seeid. at*37.
195. Seeid at*39.
196. See id at *40. The Hooters Rules cap punitive damages at $13,000, whereas Tide VII, pursuant
to the 1991 Act amendments, caps punitive damages at $300,000. See id.
197. Id In contrast, Tide VII allows any successful plaintiff to be awarded attorneys' fees. See id
Thus, the Rules apparently not only limit employees' right to attorneys' fees, but the Rules also allow an
arbitrator to impose them on an unsuccessful claimant that has made a "frivolous" claim.
198. The Rules provide that the arbitrator, in determining whether an employee has prevailed on
a claim, shall take into account extraneous factors such as "management directives." See id at *42-43.
199. The district court in Hooters followed this approach by finding that Hooters bore the burden of
demonstrating that the plaintiffs' assent to the terms of the arbitration clause was "knowing and voluntary."
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A. Defining Voluntariness
Although the term "voluntary" could be interpreted to mean
"voluntary, pursuant to ordinary contract principles," it would be
inappropriate to interpret a statute whose purpose is to protect civil
rights in this manner. As Cass Sunstein has argued, when a public law
statute alters the background common law rule, common law principles
do not provide an appropriate context within which to interpret the
statute.2"' The Supreme Court's recent decision in Oubre v. Entergy
Operations,Inc.,2° 1 illustrates this idea. The Court in Oubre rejected the
argument that the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), °2
which sets forth specific and demanding requirements for waivers of
claims under the ADEA, should be interpreted as incorporating a
common-law "tender back" requirement."' Similarly, applying this
principle to section 118, Congress endorsed the use of arbitration to
resolve discrimination claims if the agreement to arbitrate is "appropriate," which at a minimum should be construed as referring only to truly
voluntary agreements. In determining whether an employee's agreement to arbitrate discrimination claims is voluntary, courts should use
a more demanding standard of voluntariness than that assumed by
common law contract principles. As typically, the employee has either
signed an agreement containing an arbitration clause or assented to a
clause inserted in an employee handbook, most agreements to arbitrate
20 4
discrimination claims survive a common law assent test.

See id. at *83.
200. SeeSunstein, supra note 124, at 480-81. To illustrate this idea, Sunstein suggests that the
Supreme Court erred when it interpreted the fee-shifting provision of Title VII as precluding a prevailing
plaintiff from recovering attorneys' fees from an intervening party. Seeid. at 481 n.305 (citing Independent
Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989)). The majority of the Court found that the
provision was subject to the equities of allowing an intervenor to participate in the suit without being held
liable for fees. Sunstein reasoned that Title VII's fee-shifting provision should have been viewed as a
rejection of the common law approach of equitable balancing. See id at 482 n.305 (citing Zipes, 491 U.S.
at 771-78 (Marshall,J., dissenting)).
201. 118 S. Ct. 838 (1998).
202. S&eOWBPA § 201, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978, 983 (1990).
203. The defendant employer argued that a contract tainted by fraud or duress isvoidable at the
option of the injured party only if the injured party first "tenders back" the benefits received under the
contract. SeeOubre, 118 S. Ct at 841. The Court refused to apply this principle to a release that failed to
comply with the requirements of the OWBPA, reasoning that a tender back requirement "might tempt
employers to risk noncompliance with the OWBPA's waiver provisions, knowing that it will be difficult to
repay the monies." Id at 842. Thus the Court recognized that the strict waiver requirements set forth in
the OWBPA, an antidiscrimination statute, displaced the common law contract doctrine of "tender back."
See
id
204. In Gilmer, the Supreme Court noted that there was no basis for invalidating the arbitration
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A suitable standard to look to in defining the type of arbitration
agreement that would be "appropriate" under section 118 is the
"knowing and voluntary" standard required by a number of circuit
courts, and codified by Congress in amendments to the ADEA, for valid
releases of substantive discrimination claims. When an employer lays
off an employee and offers a severance package, for example, it is
common for the employer to require the employee to sign a release
waiving any claims it may have against the employer. If the claims
waived in such a release are statutory discrimination claims, GardnerDenverprovides in dictum that the
employee's waiver of such claims must
20 5
be "knowing and voluntary."
A number of circuit courts have relied on this language in GardnerDenver to require that employee releases are knowingly and voluntarily
entered into, considering a number of factors relating to the circumstances under which the agreement was made. 0 6 A leading case is the
Seventh Circuit's holding in Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway
Co. 20 7 In Pierce, the Seventh Circuit found that, in certain situations, such

as where the employee is not represented by counsel and the employer
prepares a standard form release, a court should consider the "totality
of the circumstances" under which the agreement was executed in
assessing its validity. 208 Factors that courts have considered in viewing

agreement on grounds of contract law. SeeGilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33
(1990) (finding no evidence that Mr. Gilmer was "coerced or defrauded" into signing the Form U-4). In
one district court case involving a Form U-4, the judge upheld the arbitration clause notwithstanding its
mandatory nature. The judge acknowledged that, even if the employer had explained the meaning of
clause to the employee, the employee would have had little choice but to sign, since the Form U-4 is an
industry-wide requirement for securities personnel. See Stone, supra note 43, at 1038.
In another case, the judge applied ordinary principles ofoffer and acceptance and found that a Title VII
claimant's signature on an "Agreement of Hire" containing an arbitration clause manifested "positive and
unequivocal" intent to enter into the contract. SeJohnson v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447,
1454 (D. Minn. 1996). Although the plaintiff had not read the arbitration clause, the judge nonetheless
upheld the contract, citing the familiar maxim that "[flailing to read or understand the language of a
contract serves as no defense under the law." Id; see also Edward Brunet, Arbitration and ConstitutionalRights,
71 N.C. L REV. 81, 106 (1992) (finding that few courts invalidate arbitration agreements for lack of assent
or under an adhesion contract analysis). Cf Hooters, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3962, at *83 (finding that,
although plaintiffls agreement to arbitrate Title VII claims would be found to be "knowing" under ordinary
contract principles, under more demanding statutory requirements, the employer bore the burden of
demonstrating that plaintifPs agreement was knowing and voluntary).
205. SeeAlexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974).
206. See Bormann v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 875 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1989); Stroman v. West
Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1989); O'Hare v. Global Natural Resources, Inc., 898 F.2d
1015, 1017 (5th Cir. 1990); Torrez v. Public Serv. Co., 908 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1990); Coventry v. United
States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1988).
207. 65 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1995).
208. The court reasoned that the inquiry into voluntariness must go beyond the requirements of
contract law to fulfill the purpose of the discrimination statutes. According to the court, "[t]o assume that,
notwithstanding strong evidence to the contrary, a signature implies understanding is to allow a rule of
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the totality of the circumstances include the employee's education and
experience, the employee's input in negotiating the terms of the
settlement, whether the employee actually read and considered the
release before signing, whether the employee was represented by
counsel, whether the consideration given for the waiver exceeded the
benefits to which the employee was already entitled, and whether the
employer acted improperly in obtaining the release." 9 Because releases
of employer liability occur at the time of termination, the totality
approach naturally does not take into account whether the waiver was
imposed as a condition to employment. Certainly if such a heightened
standard were applied to arbitration agreements, an agreement imposed
as a condition to employment would not pass a voluntary and knowing
test.
Additional guidance as to what constitutes a "voluntary and knowing"
waiver can be gleaned from the statutory requirements contained in the
OWBPA.21 ° Section 201 of the OWBPA, enacted in 1990, amends the
ADEA to require that specific conditions be met in order for the waiver
of "any right or claim" under the ADEA to be valid.21' The amendment
requires that any such waiver be "knowing and voluntary" and then sets
forth in detail what constitutes a knowing and voluntary waiver,
including requirements that the waiver use language "calculated to be
understood" by the employee, 212 refer specifically to claims arising under
the ADEA, 213 advise the employee to consult with an attorney, 2 4 and
provide a waiting period within which the employee is free to consider
whether to execute the agreement, 215 as well as a period within which
216
the employee is free to revoke the agreement after its execution.
Although the amendment does not speak to the validity of a waiver
imposed as a condition to employment, the statutory language
goes even
217
further to expressly invalidate any prospective waiver.

contract law to play too salient a part in the administration of a remedial civil rights statute." Id at 571
(quoting Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1172 (5th Cir. 1976).
209. See id. at 571.
210. SeeOWBPA § 201, Pub. L No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978, 983 (1990).

211. The suggestion that the OWBPA be looked to in applying a "knowing" requirement to
arbitration agreements has been raised elsewhere. Se, eg., Recent Case, 109 HARV. L REV. 1439, 1443-44
(1996).
212. 29 U.S.C. § 626(I)(1)(A) (1994).
213. See id. § 626(B).
214. &e id. § 626(E).
215. Seeid § 626(F).
216. ,&eid.§ 626(G).
217. See
id § 626(c) (defining a "knowing and voluntary" waiver as one where the employee "does not
waive rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is executed").
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Of course, an employee's release of all statutory discrimination claims
is distinguishable from an employee's waiver of access to a judicial
forum in which to adjudicate such claims. Although some, including the
EEOC, have taken the position that the OWBPA's reference to "any
right or claim" should be construed as applying to the right to a judicial
forum," 8 what is suggested here is a different point-that the heightened
standards applied in cases like Pierce and codified in the OWBPA are
useful precedents for defining what is "appropriate" arbitration under
section 118. Otherwise, to define voluntariness according to ordinary
contract principles renders the "where appropriate" language meaningless and ignores completely the legislative history of the 1991 Act. In
addition, it undermines the purpose of the 1991 Act to deem standardform, compulsory clauses valid contracts even if courts have adopted this
legal fiction as a matter of contract law.
To summarize, section 118 should be interpreted, consistent with the
history and purpose of the 1991 Act, to permit arbitration when the
agreement to arbitrate is truly voluntary. In addition, voluntariness
should not be defined in terms of ordinary contract principles but
according to the more stringent "voluntary and knowing" standard
applied in release cases.
B. "Public Good" Concerns against a Voluntariness Requirement
Samuel Estreicher, a respected authority on labor law, raises an
interesting policy argument against a heightened voluntariness requirement for agreements to arbitrate statutory employment claims. He
argues that an in-house dispute resolution program, like a pension plan,
is a "public good:"
[A dispute resolution system] is efficiently provided, if at all, on a
collective basis. This is because the costs of such a program (an inhouse claims processing office, ombudsmen, possible mediators, etc.),
even when justified by the collective benefits to the affected
219employees, typically exceed the benefits to individual employees.
Estreicher suggests, therefore, that a heightened voluntariness requirement would not only introduce uncertainty into the law, but would
threaten to "unravel" the benefits of an ADR program for employees as

218. See EEOC Brief, supra note 171, at 13-18. Cf Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656,
660-61 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that "knowing and voluntary" requirement for waivers under the OWBPA
was not intended to extend an agreement to arbitrate discrimination claims).
219. Samuel Estreicher, redisputeAgmmmts toArbitrateStatutoy Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1344, 1359 (1997).
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a group. 220 In other words, if a company's employees were truly free to
choose between an arbitral and a judicial forum, a number of those
employees would choose a judicial forum, thus threatening the
availability of in-house ADR programs. The argument thus suggests
that it is socially desirable to impose in-house arbitration of civil rights
claims on employees because
providing arbitration is in the employees'
221
collective best interest.
The "public good" argument against a voluntariness requirement has
several flaws. First, as those who challenge mandatory arbitration are
typically employees,222 it is inappropriate to lump mandatory arbitration
together with voluntary ombudsmen and pension plans as "public
goods." There is a fundamental difference, for example, between
encouraging programs such as the Federal Express "open door" policy
described in the Introduction, 223 and imposing arbitration on employees
in an effort to limit potential exposure under the civil rights laws.
Second, the "public good" argument assumes that employers who
offer in-house mediation and open door complaint policies would not do
so if mandatory arbitration were banned. Yet Federal Express, as well
as other companies that developed in-house programs to provide
"justice on the job," did'so at a time when mandatory arbitration of
statutory claims was impermissible. 224 For years, companies such as
Federal Express offered employees the option of utilizing in-house ADR
programs-notwithstanding the fact that employees were still free to
pursue lawsuits against the company-in order to boost employee
morale, foster loyalty, avoid unionization, and give employees a voice
in company management. 225 Even within the securities industry, seven
years after Gilmer was decided, Merrill Lynch & Co. agreed to abolish

220. See id.
221. By suggesting that employees would "unravel" the system if given the choice to do so,
Estreicher's argument also effectively concedes that these agreements are adhesive and not the product of
mutual assent. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (describing these agreements as contracts of
adhesion).
222. For example, David Schwartz suggests that the "clearest indication" that mandatory arbitration
is more beneficial to employers than employees is the fact that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate are
insisted upon by the employers themselves. David S.Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print
to Prtqect Bg Business:
Employee and Comnsumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIs. L REV. 33, 62. In a survey
Schwartz conducted of federal cases involving the arbitration of employment disputes, the employer moved
to compel arbitration in 40 out of 40 cases. Id. at 62 n.88 (conducting a LEXIS search using the terms
"Federal Arbitration Act and (employment or Title VII) and compel arbitration and date (after 1993)").
223. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
224. Se shpra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (discussing David Ewing's observations concerning
in-house dispute resolution programs). Ewing's book was published in 1989, two years prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer. See EWING, supra note 2.
225. See genera/l EWING, supra note 2, at 21-34 (discussing the reasons that companies have instituted
"corporate due process" systems).
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mandatory arbitration. As of July 1998, Merrill Lynch has allowed
aggrieved employees to "opt out" of the established arbitration system
to adjudicate discrimination and harassment claims.226 Thus it does not
necessarily follow that companies will refuse to offer in-house ADR
programs simply because employee agreements to arbitrate civil rights
claims are subject to a heightened voluntariness standard.
In short, the "public good" argument is based on three questionable
assumptions: (1) that all ADR is beneficial for employees, (2) that
employers will not offer in-house ADR programs if employees are
allowed to opt out of the system, and (3) that the benefits of ADR
outweigh the importance of allowing employees the choice of a judicial
forum to enforce their civil rights. Even if one accepts that ADR,
including arbitration, is a "good" to be promoted, it is not socially
desirable to allow employers to force the forum on employees who are
victims of discrimination.
C. Uniqueness of Discrimination

Imposing a heightened voluntariness requirement to an agreement to
arbitrate discrimination claims would depart from prior cases, such as
Mitsubishi and McMahon, in which the Supreme Court upheld agreements to arbitrate statutory claims without scrutinizing the voluntariness
of the arbitration agreements. But unlike the securities and antitrust
statutes, statutes such as the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII are unique in
that they protect what is arguably a more fundamental right: the right
against discrimination in employment. Arbitration of discrimination
claims raises unique issues, not only because the right at issue is
fundamental, but because of the history of private discrimination in this
country, and the perception that private, less formal processes are less
likely than formal ones to minimize prejudice in resolving disputes.
Therefore, it is reasonable to treat discrimination claims differently by
requiring a heightened standard of consent to arbitrate such claims.
The fundamental nature of the right against discrimination has been
recognized by academics, courts, U.S. Presidents, and the EEOC. In its
recent policy statement on mandatory arbitration, the EEOC argues
that the laws protecting against discrimination in employment, like other
Federal civil rights laws, "flow directly from core Constitutional

226. Merrill Lynch & Co. recendy changed its company policy to abolish all mandatory arbitration.
As of July 1998, Merrill Lynch employees have the option of either utilizing in-house mediation or
arbitration, or resolving claims in court. See Kathy Bishop, Menill Lynck The Real Dea4 Smith Bamq's
Seulement ofa Sex DicriminationSuit Pales Next to This One, N.Y. POST, May 7, 1998, at 35.
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'
principles."227
To emphasize the fundamental nature of the
antidiscrimination laws, the EEOC quotes from a public address that
PresidentJohn F. Kennedy delivered in 1963, just prior to introducing
a civil rights bill:

We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the
Scriptures and it is as clear as the American Constitution.
The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be
afforded equal rights and equal opportunities, whether we are going
to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be treated.228
Although the antidiscrimination laws are not identical to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution, the statutes flow from the same
purpose of eradicating discrimination.
In determining the scope of Title VII in other contexts, courts have
recognized that the statute's purpose is to protect fundamental rights.
For example, employer dress code and grooming restrictions, even if
more often adopted by members of one sex or race (such as prohibitions
on long hair or "corn rows") have been found to involve matters
relatively trivial compared to the "constitutional interests protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII." 22 9 In determining which

restrictions do not fall within Tide VII, courts have defined the rights
that Tide VII protects as being essential.
In a recent opinion addressing mandatory arbitration,23 ° Federal

227. EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 167, pt. II.
228. Id. (quoting PresidentJohn F. Kennedy's Radio and Television Report to the American People
on Civil Rights,June 1I, 1963, PUB. PAPERS 468, 469 (1963)); see also id, pt. II n.6 (quoting President
William Clinton on the importance of eradicating discrimination).
229. Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also Willingham
v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[A] line must be drawn between
distinctions grounded on such fundamental rights as the right to have children or to marry and those
interfering with the manner in which an employer exercises his judgment as to the way to operate a
business.").
230. &e Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 3779, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9226 (S.D.N.Y.,
June 23, 1998). Ironically, the case itself illustrates the problems of resolving discrimination claims outside
of the judicial process. A class of former female employees brought an action against Smith Barney in a
well-publicized sex discrimination and harassment case. The parties agreed to a settlement pursuant to
which the claimants would submit disputes to arbitration administered outside of the securities industry,
and Smith Barney committed to spend at least $15 million over a four-year period on "Diversity-Related
Programs and Initiatives." See id at *44-46.
The settlement, particularly the provision committing Smith Barney to spending on diversity programs,
was touted by plaintiffs' counsel as "historic." Bishop, supra note 226, at 35. However, Judge Motley
initially denied approval of the proposed settlement, finding that the agreement failed to specify the types
ofexpenditures that would qualify as being "diversity related." Martens, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9226, at
*69. If personnel training qualified as such an expenditure, for example,Judge Motley reasoned that the
$15 million figure would be "grossly inadequate." Id at *69-70.
Judge Motley ruled that the court had jurisdiction to deny approval of the settlement, notwithstanding
the fact that the plaintiffs had signed Form U-4 agreements to arbitrate the harassment and discrimination
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District Judge Constance Baker-Motley proposed that the right to a
judicial forum to adjudicate Title VII claims is not only fundamental,
but may be inalienable. Citing to a number of respected scholars 23 1 for
the proposition that some federally-granted rights are inalienable, Judge
Motley suggested that, particularly in settings of unequal bargaining
power, waivers of Title VII rights are not socially desirable as they
defeat the societal goals the statute aims to protect and produce
windfalls for those in superior bargaining positions. 3 2 Judge Motley
relied in part on this reasoning to hold that the plaintiffs, a class of
former investment bank employees, could meet their burden of
demonstrating that the 1991 Act evinced an intent to prohibit prospective arbitration agreements, such as the Form U-4, to resolve Title VII
claims. 233 Judge Motley's analysis suggests that the right against
discrimination in employment is so basic a right that it should never be
the subject of bargaining. This would suggest that any predispute
agreement to arbitrate discrimination claims should be invalid.
Another problem with arbitration that is especially troubling in the
discrimination context is that it may not be as effective as formal,
adjudicative processes in minimizing the very prejudice that statutes
such as Title VII are designed to eliminate. The American judicial
system has incorporated "norms of fairness and even-handedness" into
its institutional psyche and procedure. 234 The formalities and rituals of
a courtroom trial, the Code ofJudicial Conduct, life tenure of federal
judges, and the doctrine of stare decisis operate together to reduce the
potential for prejudice in several ways. The formalities and rituals hold
prejudice in check by reminding those present of the "higher" ideals

claims. She stated that the validity of the agreement to arbitrate Tide VII claims was "sufficiently unclear"
to find that the court had jurisdiction to review the settlement. Id. at *7.
231. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
V w ofthe Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Lawrence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundm:
InaenableRights, Affnahma Dutiu, and the Dilnmma of D"dn, 99 HARV. L REV. 330, 333 (1985); Margaret
Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARV. L REV. 1849, 1863 (1987); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inanability
and the Theosy ofPropertyRights, 85 COLUM. L REV. 931, 940-41 (1985).
232.

See Martens, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9226, at *16-17.

On the notion that certain rights are

inalienable, consider also the opinion of constitutional law scholar Bruce Ackerman:
[W]e believe that there are some things workers shouldn't be forced to bargain about-like
an employer's demand that he or she endure racial or sexual subordination .... Most of us
don't think that employers should be allowed to put such humiliating demands on the
bargaining table. We support legal guarantees to workers of certain basic rights before they
can bargain in a self-respecting way on other conditions of employment.
I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 64 (1991).
233. SeeMarteus, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9226, at *34.
234. Richard Delgado et al., Fairnessand Formality: Miniizing the Risk ofhrudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 1359, 1387-38.
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represented by notions of justice and the "American Creed."235
The
constraints of the adjudicative process reduce decisionmaker bias by
minimizing the opportunity to decide issues on the basis of unlawful
factors.23 6 Finally, members of disadvantaged groups are more likely to
utilize a formal forum to the extent that it is perceived as being subject
to greater "rational control" than an informal procedure." 7 The
potential for bias in informal dispute resolution is exacerbated when, as
in the employment discrimination context, the arbitrator is a member
of the dominant group and the23issue
to be adjudicated "touches a
8

sensitive or intimate area of life.

The notion that formal, public institutions better protect against
prejudice than informal, private ones is further supported by an
observation made by Lani Guinier in the civil rights context. Guinier
points out that, when it comes to protecting civil rights, traditionally it
has been the experience in this country that discrimination has come,
not from the federal government, but from the private sector:
Throughout American history, the national government has been the
saviour, intervening to protect blacks from wanton cruelty at the
hands of private individuals or local authorities.... Slavery and its

sharecropping aftermath were private economic systems that were
politically approved but not politically initiated.... [P] rogress for
many blacks was symbolized by President Lincoln's Emancipation
Proclamation, the Supreme Court's Brown decision, and Congress's
1965 Voting Rights Act.239
Given this historical perception of the private sector as the source of
racism in the United States and the federal government as the "savior,"
it is not unreasonable to expect that, if potential victims of discrimination were given a free and informed choice, they would choose ajudicial
over a privately-controlled forum in which to enforce their rights.
The basic point of this article is not that arbitration is inherently
incapable of resolving statutory employment discrimination claims. The
basic issue rather is that arbitration tends to be one-sided and, therefore,
encouraging mandatory arbitration threatens to undermine the purpose
of the 1991 Act. In addition, there is both scholarly and legal support

235. Seeid at 1388.
236. Seeid. at 1389.
237. S id at 1390-91. Indeed, Delgado and his colleagues cite studies demonstrating that adversarial
processes are generally perceived as being more fair and less partial to bias than informal processes. See
inyfa notes 241-43 and accompanying text (discussing "veil of ignorance" studies).
238. See Delgado, supra note 234, at 1402-03.
239. LANI GUINIER, IFr EVERY VOICE: TURNING A CIVIL RIGHTS SETBACK INTO A NEW VISION
OF SOCIALJUSTICE 155 (1998).
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for the proposition that discrimination is different. The fundamental
importance of the right against discrimination, plus the unique role the
federal judiciary has traditionally played in protecting individuals
against private discrimination, distinguishes the antidiscrimination
statutes from other public law statutes." ° Private agreements to
arbitrate should be carefully scrutinized to ensure that employers do not
evade their responsibilities under the law by forcing employees to
"choose between their jobs and their civil rights."
IV. CONCLUSION

The liberal philosopher John Rawls devised an intuitively sensible
mechanism for evaluating the fairness of a legal system. His basic
premise is that just principles are those that a free and rational person
would select if positioned behind a "veil of ignorance." 24 ' In other
words, a fair rule is one that a hypothetical rulemaker would select when
ignorant of what his position in society would be and therefore of how
the choice of rule would affect him.242 By this measure, one could argue
that the validity of a standard form agreement to arbitrate discrimination claims, imposed as a condition of employment, is not fair. It is at
best questionable that a free and rational person would choose to
uphold such an agreement if that person did not know at the time
whether4 his
position in society would end up being that of employer or
s
victim.1

As the Federal Express example 244 illustrates, arbitration and other
forms of ADR are attractive ways to reduce risk for businesses, provide
a benefit to employees, and alleviate the judiciary. Thus it makes sense

240. The idea that discrimination isdifferent is also supported by G. Richard Shell, who argues that
securities arbitration (Le.,
industry-sponsored arbitration of the sort at issue in Gib/er,Duffield, and Seus) is
not suitable for resolving Title VII claims. Because commercial arbitration is transactional in focus, it is
not suitable for addressing the societal ills that Title VII is intended to eradicate. & Shell, supra note 15,
at 568.
241. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1971); seealso id at 137-44 (discussing "veil of
ignorance" idea).
242. To illustrate the related idea of pure procedural justice, Rawls gives the example of dividing a
cake: the procedure that would best ensure a fair outcome is to have one man divide the cake and receive
the last piece, allowing the others to select before him. By forcing the man who cuts up the cake to receive
the last piece, an objective gauge of a fair division is assured. &e RAWLS, supra note 241, at 85.
243. Indeed, the assumption that individuals would choose formal methods ofdispute resolution over
informal methods has been tested. In one study, laboratory subjects were placed behind a "veil of
ignorance" and asked to choose among a range of procedures for resolving disputes. The vast majority of
subjects in the study selected the adversarial system over other methods ofdispute resolution. See Delgado,
supra
note 234, at 1388 (citingJohn Thibaut et al., Pcwdura.ksdi as Faiess, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1288
(1974)).
244. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
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that Congress would encourage the use of voluntary ADR in the 1991
Act, just as these methods have become more popular.
Yet arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims,
notwithstanding its potential benefits, should not be imposed as a
condition of employment. This conclusion follows both as a matter of
interpreting the 1991 Act as well as a matter of policy. If we ignore the
spirit of the 1991 Act, and find Congressional intent to encourage all
types of arbitration,245 an employer could legally fire any female or
minority employee who refused to sign an arbitration clause in an
employment agreement. 2" Such a result contradicts an express purpose
of the 1991 Act-to expand Title VII remedies, including the right to
ajury trial, available to victims of discrimination. It is also unjust to the
extent that the benefits of an arbitration system accrue disproportion' Although arbitration may
ately to those who "own the stacked deck."247
in some cases benefit both employees and employers, the system will not
produce just results-as Auerbach put it, there will be no possibility for
"justice without law"-unless arbitration is premised on a mutual,
voluntar , recognition that avoidance of the courts is in both parties' best
interests. This requirement is particularly compelling when the issue to
be resolved implicates civil rights.

245. See Seus v.John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182-83 (3d Cir. 1998), cer.
denied 1999 WL 80340
(U.S. Feb. 22, 1999).
246. &ee,eg., Desiderio v. NASD, 2 F. Supp. 2d 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). In Deaiderio, the plaintiff, Susan
Desiderio, applied for a position as securities representative with SunTrust Bank. When registering with
the NASD as required by the terms of her employment, Ms. Desiderio struck out the clause in the Form
U-4 requiring her to arbitrate any dispute with SunTrust. Because of her refusal to submit to arbitration,
the NASD denied Ms. Desiderio's application for registration, and SunTrust revoked its offer of
employment. Seeid at 520. The court nonetheless upheld the arbitration clause, citing Gibser and the
circuit court opinions that have followed Gimer. Said. at 522-25.
247. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 261 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1987, § 3, at 8 (statement of Sheldon H. Elsen, Chairman, ABA Task Force
on Securities Arbitration)).

